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By Hook or By Crook: 
Conformity, Assimilation and 
Liberal and Conservative Poor Relief Theory 
Larry Cala Backer* 
He who gives, dominates. The theory of the donor works not only at the 
level of individuals and societies but also for civilizations.·· 
I suspect that my role today is to play the part of Cassandra,l not the 
Cassandra whose prophecies go unheeded, but rather the Cassandra who 
tells people what they may not want to hear. That, after all, is the central 
irony of Cassandra's curse--there is no magic in getting people to ignore 
the obvious; it requires merely the exhibition of reality itself. 
I want to reveal my intention here in fairly provocative terms. At their 
core, there are no substantial differences between the so-called liberal and 
conservative perspectives on welfare and welfare reform illustrated by the 
papers presented at this Symposium. All share the same basic normative 
socio-cultural assumptions--that is, the respect for those social taboos 
which define our society. Indeed, each perspective serves to affirm the 
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa; B.A. 1977, Brandeis University; M.P.P. 1979, 
J.F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; J.D. 1982, Columbia University. 
This article is based on remarks made at the symposium on welfare reform, Welfare Reform: 
Can it Work, sponsored by the Hastings Women's Law Journal on February 3, 1996, in San 
Francisco, California. My thanks to Mark N. Aaronson, Marty Belsky, Linda Lacey and 
Melissa Koehn for their valuable suggestions on earlier drafts of this article. 
** FERNAND BRAUDEL, II THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN 
THE AGE OF PHILLIP II 826 (Sian Reynolds trans., 1st U.S. ed. 1973). 
1. For those of you who do not remember your ancient cultural history, Cassandra was 
the daughter of King Priam of Troy who, endowed with the gift of prophecy, was fated by 
Apollo never to be believed. 
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basic taboos and the conduct norms which shape core traditional society, 
taboos and conduct norms which I have previously examined in some detail. 
And not just any old norms, but that particular set of norms which 
currently constitutes modern American bourgeois culture. Each perspective 
evidences and affirms a common set of core socio-cultural notions about the 
poor and poor relief.2 In this, they each share much with that current bete 
noir of welfare reform, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
("PRA WO") Act of 1995 and its reincarnation as part of the welfare reform 
package signed into law on August 22, 1996 as the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRAWORA,,).3 I will 
first explain why this identity of perspectives must be so, and why the 
seeming variation in perspectives is only a necessary corollary of the 
underlying normative model in which we all think about poor relief. The 
papers presented in this Symposium serve as my principal guinea pigs for 
this exercise. 
I will then focus on one aspect of these social taboos, what I call the 
"assimilation imperative.,,4 Strong, dominant cultures absorb immigrant or 
culturally distinct groups into the prevailing culture.s Even self-consciously 
multicultural societies assimilate. In fact, such societies require conformity. 
As long as a dominant culture is strong--is at its core satisfied that it is a 
good culture--non-conformity is subversive.6 At some level, non-
2. For an extended discussion of these core assumptions animating welfare, see Larry 
Cata Backer, Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Century America: Towards a General Theory 
of Modern American Poor Relief, 44 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 871 (1995) [hereinafter 
Medieval Poor Law]; Larry Cata Backer, Of Handouts and Worthless Promises: 
Understanding the Conceptual Limitations of American Systems of Poor Relief, 34 B.c. L. 
REv. 997 (1993) [hereinafter Of Handouts and Worthless Promises]. 
3. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 141 CONGo REc. 15317-15575 (1995) (vetoed 1996) [hereinafter PRAWO]. For a 
discussion of the House of Representatives version of what became PRA WO, see Larry Cata 
Backer, Welfare Reform at the Limit: An Essay on the Futility of "Ending Welfare as We 
Know It, " 30 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REv. 339 (1995) [hereinafter Welfare Reform at the 
Limit]. As this article was being readied for printing, Congress was passing and the 
President was signing into law, a welfare reform package which is substantially similar to 
the welfare reform provisions of PRA WO which was previously vetoed. See Robert Pear, 
The Welfare Bill: The Overview; Senate Passes Welfare Measure, Sending it for Clinton's 
Signature, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1996, at A4. The Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act can be found at Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) 
[hereinafter PRA WORA]. 
4. For a discussion of the assimilation imperative in the context of what would become 
PRA WO, see Larry Cata Backer, Essay: Poor Relief, Welfare Paralysis and Assimilation 
1996 UTAH L. REv. 223 (1996). 
5. See, e.g., ANDREW M. GREELEY, ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRELIMINARY 
RECONNAISSANCE (1974) (on the way in which assimilation works in the U.S.) 
6. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American 
Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269, 362 (1992) 
(noting the existence of the view that difference in cultural norms is viewed as subversive). 
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conformity inevitably dooms a culture by substitution. Except perhaps in 
the rarified world of theory, a culture cannot be and not be at the same 
time. What varies over time is merely the consensus of what constitutes the 
minimum amount of conformity necessary to contain culture-threatening 
subversion. When the consensus of what constitutes an acceptable level of 
conformity is reduced, some speak of a tolerant culture.7 When the 
opposite occurs, some speak of repression.8 
I will show how each of the papers presented, whether you can describe 
them as "liberal" or "conservative," is no less wed to the notion of the 
necessity of social conformity than is the conservative Republican 
PRA WORA. However, the drive to assimilate our poor is manifested in 
very different ways by the PRA WORA and by each of the presenters in this 
Symposium. This variation does not threaten social conformity, but rather 
is a necessary consequence of differences in the way in which the various 
papers conceive of an acceptable level of conformity within our social 
ordering. It is the way in which each of us gives value to all the rules 
which together comprise our social ordering; it is how we arrive at policy. 
Our social ordering, however, also constricts policy by establishing a set of 
boundaries. The boundaries allow variations on the "theme" but the basis 
of the "thenle" remains the same, regardless of which political camp is 
taking center stage. 
I end in Part III with a preliminary view of the possibility of communi-
cation. I want to explore how, and in what manner, these papers and 
critical academic writing can be significant within the discourse of dominant 
culture. I suggest that critical writing at once hides the normative values 
7. Will even a minimally conformist culture tolerate all otherwise incompatible cultural 
practices or beliefs? Consider the acceptability of female circumcision. See, e.g., Hope 
Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital Mutilation:" Feminist Human Rights Discourse 
and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1995); Fitnat Naa-Adjeley Adjetey, 
Reclaiming the African Woman's IndiViduality: The Struggle Between Women's Reproduc-
tive Autonomy and African Society and Culture, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1351, 1361 (1995); 
Daliah Setareh, Recent Developments: Women Escaping Genital Mutilation - Seeking 
Asylum in the United States, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 126 (1995). 
Another important question, one which I do not explore in this article, relates to the 
question of who can speak for the culture. This question involves the intersection of popular 
culture, of mores and politics, and of power and identity. See generally, Richard Delgado, 
Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 61 (1996) 
(discussed infra at note 145); Joseph W. Schneider, Social Problems Theory: The Construc-
tionist View, 11 ANN. REv. Soc. 209,214-19 (1985) (on the ways in which elites compete 
for ownership of issues, and how those issues are shaped as a result). 
8. See, e.g., Leslie G. Espinoza, Multi-Identity: Community and Culture, 2 VA. J. SOc. 
POL'y & CULTURE 23, 38 (1994) ("Linguistic assimilation has been a particularly effective 
instrument in cultural suppression and eventually obliteration."). These forces may work 
informally as well. See, e.g., Yvonne M. Cherena Pacheco, Latino Surnames: Formal and 
Informal Forces in the United States Affecting the Retention and Use of the Maternal 
Surname, 18 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 24-35 (1992). 
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held in common with subordinating groups, and yet, perversely miscon-
ceives the strength and focus of the dominating group discussion this 
scholarship seeks to interrogate. The result is the silence of internal 
communication within communities, and noise passing for dialogue between 
communities. 
I. On the Necessary Conservatism of Our Criticism of Welfare 
Reform 
People who think about poor relief argue that the welfare system is 
broken in some manner or other. The articles presented at this Symposium 
are no exception. Each has posited an alternative vision of welfare, ranging 
from something radically different to something very close to today's 
system. Each has also distanced the ideas or program described from those 
put forward by Republican Party "reformers" in Congress. Even if they do 
not argue that the current structure of poor relief is fundamentally flawed, 
most academics argue that current conservative reform proposals, and 
specifically those set forth in the PRAWO,9 are at best misguided and at 
worst fatally flawed. They particularly condemn, to a greater or lesser 
degree, the current Republican position that "[ w ]elfare entitlement must be 
replaced by limited benefits that are contingent on self-improvement and 
work."lo 
Like many others currently dealing with issues of welfare reform, the 
articles presented at this Symposium express a discomfort with "propos-
als ... designed to punish welfare recipients for violating state-favored 
behavioral norms or values and to manipulate recipients not complying with 
these norms,',ll and proposals which scapegoat other social subgroups, 
particularly immigrants and women of color. The current welfare reform 
literature tends to loudly decry "pernicious examples of value-intrusive 
welfare reform,,,12 the devaluation of the caretaking role of mothers, 13 
9. PRA WO, supra note 3, which became law as PRA WORA, supra note 3. 
10. E. Clay Shaw, Welfare: 'The Fight is Not Over, , WASH. POST, NAT'L WKLY. ED., 
Feb. 12-18, 1996, at 26. Mr. Shaw, a Republican Representative from Florida, is the Chair 
of the Human Resources Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee. He was 
one of the chief architects of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995, 
supra note 3. But even President Clinton stated in his veto message, "I strongly support 
time limits, work requirements, the toughest possible child support enforcement, and 
requiring minor mothers to live at home as a condition of assistance, and 1 am pleased that 
these central elements of my approach have been addressed in H.R. 4." Letter from 
President Clinton to the House of Representatives (Jan. 9, 1996) (on file with author). 
11. Yvette Marie Barksdale, And the Poor Have Children: A Harm-Based Analysis of 
Family Caps and the Hollow Procreative Rights of Welfare BenefiCiaries, 14 LAW & INEQ. 
J. 1, 3 (1995). On my use of the terms "we" and "us" and "our" in front of phrases like 
"poor relief' and "welfare," see infra note 158. 
12. Barksdale, supra note 11, at 3; Deirdre English, The Women's Committee of 100 Plus, 
and Our Advertisement in The New York Times, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 317 (1996). 
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and the way in which welfare tends to marginalize or ignore immigrants, 
and especially immigrants of color. 14 The articles offer alternatives which 
might usher in a 'new legal order,' 15 or which maximize the potential of 
the compassionate system which reached its greatest flowing in the "Great 
Society" programs of the 1960s and 1970s.16 We like to think that what 
we say about welfare is somehow different from, and irreconcilable with, 
proposals which seemed to capture the attention of the traditionalist forces 
in control of Congress after 1994, forces which produced the failed 
PRA WO Act in 1995 and then successfully pushed through the substantially 
similar PRAWORA in 1996. 
Yet when we delve even a little beneath the surface of our current 
welfare system, the PRA WOIPRA WORA reform effort, and especially the 
alternatives proposed in the papers presented today, we discover what Pogo 
discovered long ago: We have met the enemy and they is us. 17 The papers 
presented in this Symposium appear very different--different in focus, 
approach, and solutions. We might be tempted to conclude that they are 
irreconcilable in many respects. 18 After all, how do we reconcile--how 
can we understand as a jurisprudential or socio-Iegal unity--proposals 
which seem to speak in different languages? Professor Gilbert seeks to 
distinguish between welfare recipients who become eligible in the aftermath 
of a decline in family income or following a change in marital status on the 
one hand, and unmarried women (especially young women) on the other, 
providing the former with aid for two years without state interference and 
13. Joanna Weinberg, The Marginalization of Women's Work: An Election Year 
"Cliffhanger, "(1996) (on file with the Hastings Women's Law Journal); Marty M. Slaughter, 
The Legal Construction of "Mother. " in MOTHERS IN LAW 73 (Martha Albertson Fineman 
& Isabel Karpin eds., 1995). 
14. See Tanya Broder & Clara Luz Navarro, A Street Without an Exit: Excerpts From 
the Lives of La tin as in Post-187 California, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 275 (1996). 
15. See, e.g, Mark N. Aaronson, Scapegoating the Poor: Welfare Reform All Over Again 
and the Undermining of Democratic Citizenship, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 213 (1996) 
(arguing for the need for a constitutionalization of social rights); MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE 
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 
(1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER] (arguing that patriarchal norms in family 
formation, and therefore the thrust of behavior modification provisions in welfare discourse, 
must be replaced by a paradigm of family based on the child-mother dyad so that single 
mothers would no longer be treated as deviant). 
16. See Neil Gilbert, Welfare Reform: Implications and Alternatives, 7 HASTINGS 
WOMEN'S L.J. 323 (1996) [hereinafter Welfare Reform], which is taken largely from 
Professor Gilbert's fuller exposition in NEIL GILBERT, WELFARE JUSTICE: RESTORING 
SOCIAL EQUITY (1995). 
17. Pogo was a cartoon character invented by Walt Kelly. In one of his adventures he 
searched everywhere in the Okefenokee swamp for the source of society's litter problem 
before discovering to his chagrin that he was looking for an aspect of himself all along. See 
WALT KELLY, OUTRAGEOUSLY POGO 114 (1985). 
18. For a discussion of my view of these similarities and differences, see infra Part III. 
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providing the others with a multi-phased program of progressive state 
intervention. 19 The Committee of One Hundred would guarantee income to 
all women without the intrusive interference of the state.20 Professor 
Aaronson seeks to guarantee social rights of equal dignity with the non-
economic rights guaranteed by the federal constitution.21 Professor 
Weinberg would reorder wage labor markets to internalize the value of 
caregiving.22 
Let's take a closer look at how this works.23 Think about poor relief 
as coordinates within a sphere, a small sphere. The boundaries of the sphere 
are defined by the normative substructure provided by the core assumptions 
of the way in which our society is ordered.24 Each variant of poor relief, 
existing or proposed, occupies coordinates within this sphere. 25 The 
coordinates may overlap, or they may be separated by some distance. 
Within the boundaries of the sphere, the distances between coordinates 
appear large, the way the distance from bedroom to kitchen may appear 
large in a house. However, when viewing the boundaries from outside the 
sphere, those distances may appear rather small, the way the same distance 
between rooms may appear when seen from an airplane overhead. 
The boundaries consist of the taboos or rules comprising our socio-
cultural substructure. The prime postulate of our social ordering is 
grounded on three fundamental notions; each of which is taken as a given. 
First, all people are responsible for their own maintenance.26 Second, all 
19. See Gilbert, Welfare Reform, supra note 16, at 333-37. 
20. See generally English, supra note 12, (considering the Women IS Pledge on Welfare 
Reform: Eliminating Poverty for Women and Their Children, produced by the Committee 
of One Hundred). 
21. See generally Aaronson, supra note 15. 
22. See generally Weinberg, supra note 13. 
23. For a more detailed discussion of what follows, see Backer, Essay: Poor Relief, 
Welfare Paralysis and Assimilation, supra note 4, from which this is largely taken. 
24. I have elsewhere described the boundaries of this normative substructure which I have 
named the static paradigm. See Larry Cata Backer, Of Handouts and Worthless Promises, 
supra note 2. 
25. In this sphere, poor relief operates as a self-organizing system in an environment of 
order and disorder from which it draws its essential qualities which then take on a life of 
their own, and with which it communicates. See Heinz von Foerster, On Self-Organizing 
Systems and Their Environments, reprinted in HEINZ VON FOERSTER, OBSERVING SYSTEMS 
2, 5-8 (1981). The sphere comprises the postulates of our reality. These postulates cannot 
be proven. These are, by mutual agreement, "by postulating the reality of the world in 
which we happily thrive." Id. at 7. Of course, the fact that boundaries exist--that postulates 
drive analysis--does not mean that these postulates go unchallenged. It is to the nature, and, 
perhaps on some level, the futility of the communication of such challenge, that I devote the 
preliminary exploration in Part III, below. 
26. This is a command from the God of the North African, Middle Eastern and European 
peoples. It is communicated explicitly as a Divine (immutable) command: 
And unto Adam he said, "Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy 
@i fH ;iiiii; ';;d liP $I 
h 
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people have free wil1.27 Lastly, there have been and always will be 
sufficient jobs to employ all willing, able-bodied people who want to 
work.28 Acceptance of a social ordering built on these notions requires 
acceptance of the existence, value, and immutability of income inequali-
wife, and thou hast eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee, saying, 
Thou shalt not eat of it: cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt 
thou eat of it all the days of thy life; 
Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee and thou shalt eat the herb 
of the field; 
In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, til thou return unto the ground; 
for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou 
return." 
Genesis 3: 17-19. 
And this Divine command traditionally has been supplemented by the compulsion of 
the secular state. In England, France, and Spain it pre-dates the Renaissance. On English 
secular labor and poor law policy, see, e.g., JOHN POUND, POVERTY AND VAGRANCY IN 
TuDOR ENGLAND (1971). On French policy just prior to the 1789 Revolution, see THOMAS 
MCSTAY ADAMS, BUREAUCRATS AND BEGGARS: FRENCH SOCIAL POLICY IN THE AGE OF 
THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1990); OLWEN H. HUFTON, THE POOR OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
FRANCE 1750-1789 131-216 (1974). On Spanish attempts at poor relief prior to the modern 
age, see JEAN SARRAILH, LA ESPANA ILUSTRADA DE LA SEGUNDA MITAD DEL SIGLO XVIII 
413-707 (Antonio Alatorre trans., 1957). 
27. This notion is as old as our dominant religion. On the nature of free will as 
understood by the religious in the West, see, e.g., UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, 
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH §311, at 82 (1994) ("Angels and men, as intelligent 
and free creatures, have to journey toward their ultimate destinies by their free choice and 
preferential love. They can therefore go astray .... [God] permits it, however, because he 
respects the freedom of his creatures and, mysteriously, knows how to derive good from it." 
It remains popular in its modern fOIm, clothed in the language of neutral principle, 
psychology, and socio-economic nostrums among both traditionalists and liberals. See, e.g., 
LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NON-WORKING POOR IN 
AMERICA 157-158 (1992) (regarding traditionalists); KATHRYN EDIN & CHRISTOPHER 
JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY AND THE UNDERCLASS 204-205 
(1992) (regarding liberals). 
28. This last one sounds a bit strange, but its pervasiveness is readily demonstrated. 
Traditionalists have internalized this notion without much thought - it exists. See, e.g., 
MEAD, NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY, supra note 27, at 85-109; CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING 
GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 (1984); but see DAVID R. REIMER, THE 
PRISONERS OF WELFARE: LIBERATING AMERICA'S POOR FROM UNEMPLOYMENT AND Low 
WAGES 29-34 (1988) (suggesting that job seekers exceed available jobs). Yet, even liberals 
believe in the possibility of full employment. Unlike traditionalists, however, liberals 
believe that full employment is possible only with some (with variations on the meaning of 
"some") intervention by the state. See, e.g., NORMAN FURNISS & TIMOTHY TILTON, THE 
CASE FOR THE WELFARE STATE: FROM SOCIAL SECURITY TO SOCIAL EQUALITY 164-166 
(1977). Their belief underlies the thinking behind efforts like the Employment Act of 1946, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1026. (1995). It may also underlie the basis of the Great Society 
intervention into the lives of the poor as well. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra, at 56. 
L ... 
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ty.29 It follows that income inequality must be a function of productivity 
or wealth accumulation--even a minimum of productive conduct is 
sufficient to provide an adequate amount of wealth or income to meet one's 
needs.3D Destitution is thus primarily little more than social deviance, a 
condition within the control of the poor themselves, and, ultimately,31 
directly a function of their refusal or inability to work.32 Poverty, as a 
pathological condition affecting the individual pauper, is not a symptom of 
a malfunctioning society or an economic system. Even for those with 
physical disabilities, there is a general understanding that such people can 
overcome their "disabilities" with the "right" kind of support and fend for 
themselves. If they do not, their "failure" is seen as an indication of their 
unwillingness to overcome their "handicaps.,,33 
29. A person has a right to the substantially undisturbed enjoyment of the fruits of his or 
her labor which constitutes the reward for productivity. This is the way in which our society 
has chosen to sort its members. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 28, at 234 ("Some people 
are better than others. They deserve more of society's rewards, of which money is only one 
small part."). John Galbraith perhaps echoed these sentiments more tactfully when he noted 
that "[t]here has always been the underlying contention that, as a matter of natural law and 
equity, what a man has received save by proven larceny is rightfully his." JOHN K. 
GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 68 (3d ed. 1976). 
30. Income inequality serves as a "neutral" form of discrimination in favor of the produc-
tive. On the lack of neutrality of this device, see, e.g., Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, 
and Community Economic Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil 
Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1463, 1479 (1994). 
31. We accept the possibility of temporary unproductiveness. People get laid off or fired, 
but for that situation, alternative schemes of governmental charity are available - primarily 
through the unemployment compensation system. For a discussion of those programs, see 
JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY 1900-1980, at 71-75 
(1981); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP 128-32 (1986). 
32. Consider in this light the arguments of Daniel P. Moynihan, who has spent a lifetime 
criticizing the tendency of "society" to accept poverty related deviance as normal. Daniel 
P. Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 AMERICAN SCHOLAR 17 (1993). See also James 
Q. Wilson, The Rediscovery of Character: Private Virtue and Public Policy, in ON 
CHARACTER: ESSAYS BY JAMES Q. WILSON 11, 16-17 (1991); Nancy Wright, Not in 
Anyone's Backyard: Ending the 'Contest of Non responsibility' and Implementing Long-Term 
Solutions to Homelessness, 2 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 163, n.29 (1995) (describing 
popular views of the causes of welfare dependency). 
33. Consider the now near apocryphal figure of Helen Keller. Frank Bowe has long made 
the point that people such as Helen Keller are routinely portrayed unrealistically to suggest 
that disabilities are something which can be 'overcome.' FRANK G. BOWE, HANDICAPPING 
AMERICA: BARRIERS TO DISABLED PEOPLE III (1978). See also Backer, Medieval Poor 
Law, supra note 2, at 947 & n.225 (''understand that one epoch's disabled person is another 
epoch's ordinary (although challenged) person"). 
Rather, the differing abilities of people ought to be accepted for what they are. A 
consequence of this rethinking of the nature and productivity limiting potential of abilities 
different from that of any dominant 'norm' has steadily eroded as society has come more 
and more to think that the 'traditionally' disabled ought to work. This is reflected in 
legislation such as the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 
Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994», and related legislation. 
tub 
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Poor relief, therefore, is fundamentally contrary to the ordering of the 
social and economic system. It is a process by which the state takes from 
the productive the fruits of their productivity for distribution to the non-
productive. Poverty indicates individual failure (intentional or not, it does 
not matter) within the social and economic fabric of life. The amelioration 
of poverty requires actions at once necessary and inimical to that fabric. As 
such, society will permit the transfer of resources from the productive to the 
non-productive only if the consequences of non-transfer are deemed worse 
than those of transfer.34 
But recall that our core norms, our social and religious mores, teach us 
that nothing comes without cost. Poor relief is not given---it is sold. The 
primary price the poor pay is acceptance and conformity.35 Accep-
tance--assimilation of the postulates on which the social and economic 
system rest~acknowledges that there is a reason why some are wealthy 
and others are poor. It provides a justification for the existing social 
structure based on notions of merit and a modem form of primogenitor. 
Conformity-internalization of the specific conduct norms of the relief 
giver~assures stability as well as the potential for minimizing the need to 
give aid in the first place. And so, we arrive at the valuing of income 
transfers to the poor. Looming large in the valuation is the cost of socio-
cultural subversion.36 Income transfers to paupers are inherently subver-
See also Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans With Disabilities Act: Analysis and 
implicatiOns o/a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413 
(1991); R. Bales, Once is Enough: Evaluating When a Person is Substantially Limited in 
the Ability to Work, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 203 (1993). Cj School Board of Nassau County, 
Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) ("Congress acknowledged that society's 
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the 
physical limitations that flow from actual impairment."); Martha T. McCloskey, Note, 
Rethinking Equality and Difference: Disability Discrimination in Public Transportation, 97 
YALE L.J. 863,872 (1988) ("All people have physical limitations, and all can expect to have 
more disabilities as they grow older. The labels 'able-bodied' and 'disabled' only 
approximate the wide range of human physical activity. . .. An able-bodied norm is 
incorrect not only because it implies that disability is unusual, but because it also suggests 
that disability is inherently deviant and abnormal in a normative sense. "). Further discussion 
on this topic is beyond the scope of this article. 
34. Only two situations qualify without controversy: death; and an absolute inability to 
be productive. Temporary unemployment may also qualify, but that is treated differently 
in the United States. See PAITERSON, supra note 31, at 67-71. Of course, given the recent 
shift in public policy, exemplified by federal legislation such as the Americans With 
Disabilities Act of 1990, supra note 33, the set of people who can claim total disability has 
been shrinking. 
35. Herbert Gans provides a list of other types of "value" extracted from the poor in 
return for the provision of institutional relief. See Herbert J. Gans, Positive Functions o/the 
Undeserving Poor: Uses o/the Underclass in America, 22 POL. & Soc. 269, 271-79 (1994). 
36. For those who find this hard to understand, I refer you to the sense of Congress 
memorialized in PRA WORA. See infra note 128 (citing PRA WORA, supra note 3, at 
§ 10 1 (1), (2), and (8)). For those who think this is a problem of recent invention, I direct 
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sive because such transfers carry with them the potential to destabilize the 
existing social order. But income transfers to the poor produce social value 
exceeding the cost of its provision in two significant ways. First, it 
produces and maintains social stability; the failure to transfer any income 
to the destitute might be more destabilizing than its provision.37 Second, 
the nature of the giving as fundamentally conditional provides a means of 
suppressing deviance by co-opting it, a subject I take up in more detail in 
Part II. 
The primary rule of welfare and welfare reform is this: We will give 
as long as we get what we pay for. Poor relief is reduced to a search for 
the "optimum" amount of transfer. Society, therefore~ will tend to spend a 
great deal of time and effort worrying about the taxonomy of poverty, based 
on notions of productivity both for its own sake and as a tool of assimila-
tion to the values represented by productivity of the type deemed socially 
desirable.38 This taxonomy employs two sorting devices-eligibility 
discrimination and hierarchies of need.39 As a result, the receipt of 
undeserved institutional charity is strongly taboo.40 Society concentrates 
on weeding out welfare "cheats" and fraud; we worry more about the 
you to the descriptions of choking conformity common in this country in the 1920's. See, 
e.g., SINCLAIR LEWIS, BABBITI (1922). 
37. See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE 
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 341-47 (1971); MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE 
LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 313-
42 (1988) ("Although AFDC's harsh regulations intervene in the daily life of poor women 
on behalf of the status quo, the program also paradoxically contains the potential to counter 
social conditions on which capitalism and patriarchy depend. Herein lies its threat to the 
haves and its possibilities for the have nots."). 
38. Recall that criminal activity can also be highly productive in the traditional sense of 
producing wealth sufficient to sustain oneself. However, that sort of activity is deemed 
wrong, perhaps immoral, and certainly destabilizing. In some instances it is destabilzing 
enough that society requires a declaration of "war" against it (consider, for example, the 
generation-long war on drugs). 
39. Thus, society will tend to create taxonomies based on need. The term 'need' is 
constructed and reconstructed in its detail to suit the particular necessities of society at any 
one time. Frances Piven and Richard Cloward have examined this phenomenon from the 
perspective of social control. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 37, at 347. Gilbert Steiner 
and Daniel P. Moynihan have examined it from the perspective of politics. See GILBERT Y. 
STEINER, SOCIAL INSECURITY: THE POLITICS OF WELFARE (1966); Moynihan, supra note 
32. Need is used to determine the quantity of aid made available to the individual pauper, 
and to some extent the order in which such quantities are distributed, based on the 
immediacy of the individual pauper's need. 
40. The pathologically poor, it is assumed, would rather exaggerate the level of their 
economic distress than actually have to find and retain a job that does not suit them (because 
it requires work when either none is necessary for the accumulation of income or because 
illegal activities (reported as non-work) are more profitable). Cf MEAD, supra note 27, at 
151. 
t t 
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tendency to cheat than the cost of failing to provide for the eligible.41 But 
in this endeavor we are both sloppy42 and small minded.43 
Coming at welfare reform from radically different perspectives, Neil 
Gilbert and Dierdre English both exhibit a marked fidelity to the core 
normative notions of American culture. To that extent, they are "sisters" 
under the skin. Let's take a closer look at them from the perspective of our 
normative substructure. 
First, let me consider Professor Gilbert's criticism of current traditional-
ist welfare reform efforts. Professor Gilbert argues that incentive oriented 
policies are wrongheaded because they produce perverse results.44 Thus, 
Professor Gilbert argues that measures which penalize the poor for "bad 
conduct" generate high administrative costs. This would not be so bad 
except that the high costs exceed the savings generated by the penalties.45 
41. Consider, in this light, the decades long concentration by Congress and both 
Democratic and Republican Administrations on the problems of cheating. For example, the 
Carter administration initiated a "national conference on fraud, abuse and error" in 1979 to 
discuss solutions to the perennial problem of among other things, welfare fraud. See, e.g., 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE SECRETARY'S 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FRAUD, ABUSE AND ERROR: PROTECTING THE TAXPAYER'S 
DOLLAR (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1979). See generally William H. Simon, Legality, 
Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.1. 1198 (1983). However, this 
appears to be a losing battle. See KATHRYN EDIN, THERE'S A LOT OF MONTH LEFT AT THE 
END OF THE MONEY: How WELFARE RECIPIENTS MAKE ENDS MEET IN CmCAGO 96 
(1993). 
42. See, e.g, Ronald Paul Hill & Sandi Macan, Welfare Reform in the United States: 
ReSUlting Consumption Behaviors, Health and Nutrition Outcomes, and Public Policy 
Solutions, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 142, 151-154 (1996) (describing the extent of welfare "fraud" 
and the real reluctance of case workers to worry too much about it). "Even when fraud is 
obvious, the paperwork and official processes are lengthy and supervisors discourage the 
pursuit of all but the most iron-clad cases. Finally, case workers see little to be gained from 
the investigation of fraud because most recipients who are found guilty of fraud remain on 
welfare, with only a reduction in benefits to 'reimburse' the state." Id. at 153-54 (citing 
EDIN, supra note 41 (regarding the author's recent study of welfare practices in Chicago». 
43. See Monica J. Evans, Stealing Away: Black Women, Outlaw Culture and the Rhetoric 
of Rights, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 263, 273 (1993) (relating the story of Sandra Rosado, 
who was required to spend down about $4,900 in savings earmarked for higher education 
in order to preserve her mother's eligibility for welfare benefits). 
44. Gilbert, Welfare Reform, supra note 19, at 324-27. 
45. Id. at 325. According to Prof. Gilbert, this excess occurs when the issue to be 
resolved revolves around the recipient's ability to apply for health reasons (especially mental 
or physical). But consider whether, for purposes of our normative standards, such costs are 
not more "valuable" than those otherwise incurred in succoring the undeserving. 
Compliance and administrative expense generate production of a positive sort; they employ 
people, they permit productivity to be squeezed out even from the necessity to provide for 
the unproductive, and each story generated by the hearing and administrative procedure 
provides yet another layer of fable for the edification of current and future generations of 
the poor. This layer of fable serves as a valuable socio-cultural teaching tool, much like the 
stories of pre-literate peoples. Cf HERBERT 1. GANS, PEOPLE, PLANS AND POLICIES: 
ESSAYS ON POVERTY, RACISM AND OTHER NATIONAL URBAN PROBLEMS 193-224 (1991). 
tit·,ii"eMF t4M 
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Likewise, measures encouraging positive behaviors by providing services 
such as training or child day-care will, because of the inevitability of 
creaming, increase costs without statistically significant gains in objec-
tives.46 Measures that limit access to benefits merely shift costs and make 
long term integration into mainstream society by the beneficiaries that much 
harder (that is, more expensive).47 Measures that reward beneficiaries for 
returning to work create a moral hazard. If the benefits are great enough, 
then people working in jobs whose benefits are less than those provided by 
institutional relief will have an incentive to prefer welfare to work. 48 
Perhaps, worst of all, incentive-oriented policies rest on job availability.49 
46. Here, Prof. Gilbert argues that such services would disproportionately serve that 
portion of the eligible population which would have exited welfare whether or not such 
services had been provided. See Gilbert, Welfare Reform, supra note 19, at 325. On the 
other hand, as our history with wealth transfers in the twentieth century amply demonstrates, 
Americans tend to prefer to reward those who have been productive (social security) and 
those who we believe will soon be productive again (unemployment compensation) far more 
generously than those we believe have been or will be neither. Creaming may therefore be 
socially useful as a means of limiting the absolute size of the dependant population. That, 
at any rate, seems to have been the effect generally of the welfare reform programs of the 
last several generations. Sadly, this has generally served to disadvantage women. See, e.g., 
ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 37, at 362; Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preser-
vation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1249 (1983). Notions of creaming fit very well 
into distinctions we tend to make between poverty as a "status" (the chronically dependant 
poor and other euphemisms) and temporary disruption. Indeed, the belief in the significant 
normative distinction between status poverty and "temporary" or "event" poverty animates 
Professor Gilbert's proposal to divide AFDC recipients into two classes. See infra notes 
109-17 and accompanying text. 
47. Gilbert, Welfare Reform, supra note 19, at 325-326. The notion here is that while the 
limitation of access to benefits can initially reduce costs (if costs are measured as limited 
to the programs in question), it will actually increase systemic costs by shifting the expense 
of maintenance to other sectors of the institutional economy - the jails, homeless shelters, 
police manpower, and protective services. Id. Of course, as I have argued elsewhere, I 
think that Prof. Gilbert is partially correct. Some of the costs merely will be shifted to other 
public (taxation based) accounts. However, some of these costs will be shifted to private 
enterprises. See Backer, Medieval Poor Law, supra note 2, at 996-1001. Prof. Gilbert, I 
believe, suspects that the shift to private sources of institutional relief will be smaller than 
what the Congressional Republicans believe. For a discussion of the beneficial effects of 
cost shifting from the perspective of the Congressional Republicans in the 1995-96 
legislative year, see Backer, Welfare Reform at the Limit, supra note 3, at 358-359. 
48. Gilbert, Welfare Reform, supra note 19, at 326. Of course, this is the core notion of 
conservative theorists, especially since Charles Murray's work in the early 1980's. See 
MURRAY, supra note 28. It continues to be echoed today. See, e.g., MEAD, NEW POLITICS 
OF POVERTY, supra note 27, at 206-09; REpUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, CONTRACT 
WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REp. NEWT GINGRICH, REp. DICK ARMEY, AND THE 
HOUSE REpUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) 
[hereinafter CONTRACT WITH AMERICA]. 
49. On the availability of such work, see REIMER, supra note 28, at 29-34, 43-56. For 
an argument that government intervention in the labor markets necessarily produces higher 
rates of unemployment, see RICHARD VEDDER & LOWELL GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK: 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND GoVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1993). 
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But this grounding is inherently perverse because when jobs are readily 
available the incentives are unnecessary; when they are unavailable, 
incentive oriented policies serve to discourage necessarily unsuccessful job 
seekers.50 Moreover, the notion of fixing things through the device of 
block grants will create a "race to the bottom" as states seek to narrow 
eligibility standards and reduce grant size. 51 
For Professor Gilbert, the problem of eliminating the indignities of 
poverty and poor relief does not arise from any fundamental flaw within our 
society. Our core social ordering is healthy and worth maintaining. What 
is wrong are the ways in which we are attempting to "reform" welfare. 
Professor Gilbert accepts the basic scope and focus of poor relief in the 
United States; he proposes changes which would ameliorate the problem of 
institutional alms-giving. The power to ameliorate poverty, however, is in 
the hands of the poor--the state can provide structure, but the effort must 
be that of the poor. The poor can be guided and fed; were they but to 
exercise their free will in the "correct" manner, the poverty "problem" 
would disappear. 
Perhaps, more importantly, the measurement of success by cost and cost 
reduction points back to the notion that income transfer from the productive 
to the unproductive is inherently suspect. Professor Gilbert proposes that 
a different way to attain the goal is self-sufficiency, not fostering income 
or wealth equality. But self-sufficiency is defeated as much by "confiscato-
ry" redistribution as it is by overgenerous or misdirected alms. Cost 
becomes a significant factor in any welfare reform analysis. 
Consider, for example, Professor Gilbert's criticism of the efficiency 
and effectiveness arguments supporting the push to use community based 
organizations as a means of delivering social services to the poor. 52 
Community based organizations may be no more responsive to their clients 
than the state bureaucracy because too many of the beneficiaries are too 
dysfunctional to effectively participate. These organizations tend to 
exacerbate the problems of the working poor by underpaying their 
50. Gilbert, Welfare Reform, supra note 19, at 326-27. 
51. Id. But the race to the bottom has been going on for some time now. See, e.g., Note: 
Devolving Welfare Programs to the States: A Public Choice Perspective, 109 HARV. L. 
REv. 1984, 1994-97 (1996). States have not been waiting for welfare reform at the national 
level to impose some greater or lesser portion of the reforms of PRA WORA. See Barbara 
Vobejda, Going Their Own Ways: The Nation's Governors Aren't Waiting for Clinton and 
the GOP to Agree on Welfare Reform, WASH. POST, NAT'L WKLY. ED., Feb. 12-18, 1996, 
at 29 ("Once other states see what is happening, that there is a reasonable success in doing 
that ... we will see even more states move in that direction.") (quoting LaDonna Pavetti, 
a welfare specialist at the Urban Institute). And, indeed, the new welfare reform package 
will preserve the status of state waiver based poor relief programs. See Highlights: 
Changes in Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1996, at A8. 
52. Gilbert, Welfare Reform, supra note 19, at 327-31. 
404 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [VoL 7:2 
staff-they tend to exploit labor as skillfully as any non-union employer. 
Community based organizations also tend to be political and exclusionary, 
competing with functionally based groups, such as labor unions. 
"[E]xperience with various forms of neighborhood organization suggest that 
they can become just as institutionalized, rigid, inaccessible, unresponsive, 
and undemocratic as professionalized bureaucracies."53 In effect, commu-
nity based organizations, the private institution through which commentators 
believe democracy can be promoted and civil society revitalized,54 may 
well be better at mimicking the institutional responses of society than at 
reshaping it. The normative substructure remains the same even as the 
holders of power shift at some level. 
And so, the taxonomy of poverty becomes important. Creaming and 
moral hazards are to be avoided as wasteful--society does not get what it 
wants to pay for. Cost shifting and increased administrative expense may 
also be bad. Yet, I have argued that the negative effect may be less intense, 
in part, because both generate income transfers to productive members of 
society-police, social service professionals, and lawyers. 55 Work and 
time limit don't work, not because they are unfair or vehicles for domina-
tion and subordination, but because they do not efficiently or effectively 
advance the basic goal of poor relief-that is, the minimization of the 
number of unproductive members of society and the cost of their mainte-
nance. Work and time limits provisions provide examples for Professor 
Gilbert of the kind of perverse incentives he earlier illustrates. Thus, 
lifetime eligibility rules serve primarily to shift costs: those unemployed 
after two years are likely to be the most economically deviant;56 the social 
and economic costs of public works is "staggering;,,57 and compliance may 
53. RALPH M. KRAMER, VOLUNTARY AGENCIES IN THE WELFARE STATE 284 (1981) 
(citing NEIL GILBERT & HARRY SPECHT, DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY 174-77 
(1974)). However, it also promotes the myth of the devolution of power to the "representa-
tives" of the poverty communities. 
54. For a discussion of the utility of traditional private organizations as the means of 
saving poor relief from a traditionalist perspective, see, e.g., NATHAN GLAZER, THE LIMITS 
OF SOCIAL POLICY 125-27 (1988). 
55. These professionals and workers must eat too, but must they eat at the taxpayers' 
expense? That is the question of policy which we debate. The poor are even marginalized 
in the debate over cost because they may not be its primary beneficiary or object. Perhaps 
not good but certainly predictable, it is neither "their money" nor "their services" which are 
at issue. The voices of the productive always carry more weight than those of deviants. For 
an interesting discussion of the credibility of stories, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword to 
Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989). 
56. These are identified under the rubrics of teenage mothers and addicts. Gilbert, 
Welfare Reform, supra note 19, at 332. Teenage mothers and addicts are most likely not to 
possess those skills or mores necessary to survive in our culture. 
57. Id. It is more expensive for the state to provide a job than to provide a grant. On 
the other hand, as I earlier suggested, to the extent that these programs siphon off funds to 
administration, the perceived cost may be less than the actual dollars spent since there is 
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be an impossible project. 58 Professor Gilbert argues, convincingly I think, 
that in all of this, the children of the poor get lost in the shuffle. It is to 
them that Professor Gilbert directs his proposed reform, which I discuss 
below. 
But what about the program of the Committee of One Rundred 
("COR") as related by Dierdre English?59 On the one hand, the COR 
urges opposition to "punitive measures that assume that the behavior, 
attitudes, and values of women on welfare are the problem. ,,60 On the 
other, COR also speaks of the importance of deterrents to behavior which 
is not in the best interests of young women.61 These deterrents are 
important if one is to conform one's behavior to maximize opportunities 
within the system of existing cultural signals. Yet, as even the COR 
obliquely admits, that requires conformity to dominant norms to some 
significant extent. 
Consider also the COR approach to work and productivity. There 
appears to be no question that women on welfare ought to become 
productive in the socially conventional way.62 Women work. The only 
question revolves around the conditions of that labor,63 and perceptions 
value in productivity. 
58. See Id. at 332-33. The administrative expense may leave little for aid to the poor. 
Moreover, crafting the appropriate offense and punishment may be quite difficult. 
Ultimately, the real effect of compliance may be cost shifting-to private institutional 
providers of relief, as well as to police, child protective services and the like. 
59. The Committee of One Hundred [COH] is a private organization of women 
"concerned about the impending legislation on welfare." Letter from Eva Feder Kittay and 
COH pledge intended for circulation to people invited to join the COH 1 [hereinafter COH 
Letter and Pledge] (June 19, 1995) (on file with the Hastings Women IS Law Journal). 
60. Id. at 3. 
61. Thus, the Women IS Pledge on Welfare Reform: Eliminating Poverty for Women and 
Their Children provides: 
Access to and funding for contraception, family planning counseling, and 
abortion services should be improved. Early teen pregnancy and childbirth 
can be harmful to the health, education, and training of young women. 
Educational opportunities, family planning, contraceptive access, and hope 
for the future are the best and most humane deterrents. 
Id. It is not clear to me that there is a fundamental difference between the compulsion of 
the Republican behavior modification proposals and the deterrence of the COHo In either 
case, they look on welfare women (and especially young women) as children who must be 
educated in the ways of proper behavior. Professor Gilbert's proposals, in this regard, are 
the most honest in their judgment of the objects of their focus. 
62. "A great many welfare recipients want paid employment and often have labor market 
experience, but lack the skills, education, or English proficiency to obtain jobs that pay 
adequate wages to support their families." Id. at 4. 
63. "Achieving pay equity, increasing the minimum wage, creating incentives for 
employers to provide fringe benefits in contingent and other low-wage jobs, and encouraging 
collective bargaining should be integral parts of an effective and comprehensive welfare 
reform strategy." Id. at 4. Thus, the problem isn't that work is not valued, it is instead that 
the traditional structure of valued work excludes much of what women do or have 
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about the real opportunity for work. 64 Given the correct set of incentives, 
all women could internalize the economic values of solid middle class 
people. In this sense, the COH approach gives far more weight to the 
"gendered obstacles that poor women face in the labor market,,65 than does 
Professor Gilbert. Like Professor Gilbert, the COH approach does not 
question the core notion animating welfare reform discussion--that the poor 
must be conventionally productive. However, the COH approach may 
implicate the question of what it means to be conventionally productive--a 
topic largely untouched by Professor Gilbert and the COH, but at the core 
of Professor Weinberg's paper, discussed below at Part II.B. In the end, 
and whatever way one defines productivity, the papers suggest that even the 
poor must "grow up" and become good citizens in the traditional conven-
tional sense. 
The difference, and perhaps an important difference, between COH's 
approach and that of Professor Gilbert (and certainly that of the Congressio-
nal Republicans) is the extent to which each values the use of compul-
sion.66 And yet, all seek the same thing-fully, economically integrated 
traditionally been permitted to do. That, of course, is the point Joanna Weinberg addresses. 
See generally Weinberg, supra note 13; cj Lucie E. White, On the "Consensus" to End 
Welfare: Where Are the Women's Voices?, 26 CONN. L. REv. 843, 849 (1994) ("The 
welfare reform conversation never really faces up to the gender-specific disadvantages that 
women - all women, but especially the poor - confront in a labor system that was 
historically constructed to favor males."). 
64. "The labor market conditions women face, including gender- and race-based 
discrimination, limit opportunities. Women face unstable employment that pays low wages 
and lacks health and retirement benefits, inaccessible paid work, and no paid work at all." 
COH Letter and Pledge, supra note 59, at 3. 
65. White, supra note 63, at 850. For a discussion of the ways in which gendered 
discrimination affects the employability of women, see id. at 849-51. 
66. As I have argued elsewhere, 
Welfare reforms, therefore, focus poor relief on the poor themselves. Since 
the able-bodied have made deliberately vicious (though somewhat tepidly 
described by some as self-serving, or at least unenlightened) life-style choices 
the cure for poverty lies not with the system but with the recipient. Poor 
relief reforms are "people-oriented" in the sense that incentive, punishment, 
and compulsion are directed to altering unacceptable behavior. This 
orientation remains constant, whatever the political allegiance of the reform, 
and whether or not, as is currently customary, the reform is couched in the 
therapeutic language of self-sufficiency, mutual responsibility, or the 
eradication of poverty. 
Backer, Welfare Reform at the Limit, supra note 3, at 355-56. Like the Clinton administra-
tion programs for welfare reform, introduced in 1994 and forgotten by Congress in 1995, the 
COH "appears most comfortable with hortatory and educational programs to deal with the 
problem of teenage and out-of-wedlock pregnancies." Id. at 387. Their reliance on persua-
sion, rather than compulsion, rests on the notion that compulsion may not be necessary given 
the proper incentives - training, job availability, and the elimination of structural impedi-
ments to (commonly valued) work. Id. 
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women who do not violate core socio-cultural taboos.67 
II. Welfare, Culture, and Conformity 
My conclusion that the approaches taken in the papers presented are all 
premised on the same core set of norms does not mean that there are not 
differences between them. Each paper applies our socio-cultural ground 
rules differently. But this, as I will show below, is a function of interpreta-
tion within the parameters of our social "ground rules," and not evidence 
of core differences in vision. As such, these papers evidence the tensions 
and instability within the bounds of American postulates of fundamental 
socio-cultural norms. 
These tensions exist primarily between two central sets of conflicting 
notions within our established socio-cultural universe. The first is social 
conformity; the need to facilitate assimilation into the dominant culture.68 
The second is toleration (not approval) of dissent or non-conformity.69 All 
of us, and each in our own way, want the poor (along with everyone else) 
to conform to some set of norms--my point is that for the most part, they 
are the same norms. 70 
67. It is true that COH also advocates income redistribution of a kind not contemplated 
by more traditionalist versions of our nonnative substructure. But there is nothing in our 
underlying system that limits the amount of the benefit conferred on the poor. What our 
system requires is that we value the redistribution more than we value the forgone income 
"reward" to the productive. And, the COH perspective reflects a value judgment that within 
the framework of an outlook that treasures productivity and self sufficiency, current welfare 
system "grants are meager and stigmatizing;' its provisions are restrictive; it does not address 
crucial social problems of endemic unemployment, poor education, and the absence of 
support systems." COH Letter and Pledge, supra note 59, at 1. 
68. The assimilation imperative has been noted by scholars who acknowledge its impor-
tance. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96 
COLUM. L. REv. 87, 102-03 (1996) ("If limited by moral principle rather than driven by 
social fashion, assimilation, far from being the enemy of diversity, is perhaps the only means 
for reconciling this country's commitment to pluralism with its commitment to justice."). 
It has also been noted by those who condemn the assimilation principle as, for example, a 
tool of a repressive patriarchy. See FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 15, at 101-18 
(on single mothers). 
69. Until the end of the Second World War in this country, toleration never meant 
approval. With the rise of the rhetoric of rights and the drive to "equality," rhetoriticians 
have taken this word to new dimensions of meaning far removed from its traditional 
moorings. For a traditional exposition of toleration (regarding religion), see John Locke, A 
Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1, (Robert 
M. Hutchins ed., 1952). For a radical critique of the notion of toleration, see Herbert 
Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81 (1965). Justice 
Antonin Scalia, perhaps, has most succinctly expressed this traditional notion in a different 
context when he noted that "the society that eliminates criminal punishment for homosexual 
acts does not necessarily abandon the view that homosexuality is morally wrong and socially 
hannful." Romer v. Evans, 64 U.S.L.W. 4353, 4359 (U.S. May 20, 1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
70. See supra text accompanying notes 27-43. 
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I will first suggest a theory of assimilation, conformity, and tolerance 
as an abstract possibility within our normative poor relief structure. In Part 
B, I will show how each of the papers presented at this Symposium, though 
very different from each other, adhere to the same set of normative 
constructs of toleration and conformity. Ironically, the papers are similar 
to the very systems which they describe as substantially incompatible with 
their notions of 'good' poor relief. 
A. ASSIMILATION SHALL MAKE You FREE 
Groups exist. Groups have habits. Group habits evidence custom; such 
habits in the aggregate form mores-the postulates underlying group norms. 
Habits help maintain group cohesion and group identity. Group habits are 
the sum of the good of the group. The sum of group habits is culture. And 
culture is communal identity at its most basic; it permits separation of a 
group from others. All cultures either exist or they do not. No culture can 
exist long in a state of self-loathing. Cultures exist while they retain the 
conviction of their goodness. 
Groups cannot survive as such without enforcing their core norms. 
Maintenance of the social ordering serves as the primary focus of 
enforcement, the principal weapon is the power of "tradition." In the 
absence of enforcement, the group disappears. But such disappearances do 
not produce a "groupless" state. A group (the sum of the characteristics of 
a unity) disappears only to be replaced by another sum of unifying 
characteristics. This new set mayor may not embrace the people who came 
within the definition of the group in its prior iteration. Enforcement of 
culture (group norms) and the policing of group identity (those core 
characteristics that serve as a metaphysical group tatoo), is bound up in the 
group's every act, in every form of group social behavior. It is also bound 
up in every act between groups. 
Thus, everything done serves to perpetuate culture. Cultural activity 
also serves to perpetuate cultural boundaries--the distances between 
cultures. And enforcement becomes more acute where a group is 
challenged, for instance by the spurning of its norms in what it considers 
its (metaphysical) space. Every group/culture has geographic as well as 
metaphysical territory. Groups absorb everyone presumed to be part of the 
group--dominant group/culture dominates. If it does not, the dominant 
group/culture ceases to exist. It subordinates competing groups/cultures 
which cling to incompatible norms. It makes life uncomfortable for those 
who live within the geographical or metaphysical space of the dominant 
group/culture but who do not or cannot belong. 
The dominant group/CUlture defines itself, and the territory over which 
it dominates, by reference to those who do not and cannot belong either 
within or without the dominant group's/culture's physical and metaphysical 
• 
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space. In doing so, it also defines to some extent the characteristics of 
subordinate groups. These are groups which occupy the same 
(meta)physical space controlled by the dominant group. In this sense one 
can understand how European bourgeois culture can define core economic 
conduct rules, by reference to what it means to be productive and "self-
sufficient." On the same basis, one can begin to understand how race can 
be defined in the United States by reference to what it means to be "white." 
I have suggested that culture can be viewed as a function of the power 
to define and control its metaphysical space. Control itself is a complex 
process. As enforcement, it is conscious and unconscious. Conscious 
assimilative programs are easy to spot. They are also pervasive. Law, after 
all, is the ultimate tool of enforcing conformity, operating at the micro and 
macro levels.?1 Its compulsion is actual-we enforce the criminal law, as 
well as hortatory--but we tend not to enforce the criminal law either 
uniformly or consistently (for example, we tend not to enforce the 
prohibitions against private consensual sexual activity).72 The same sorts 
of compulsions are at work in our poor relief programs.?3 Statutes define 
the programs and specify eligibility criteria. People representing society 
apply these rules to promote acceptance of dominant social norms. A 
central theme of this article has been that law is inherently the creature of 
ulterior motives.?4 
The force of unconscious assimilation is more effective and more 
pervasive. The unconscious force of conformity has been the especial target 
of feminist and critical race scholars, in large part because they are such 
strong forces, and in part, because of the inevitable imperialism of dominant 
71. Consider something as simple as the law of tort. The unstated but pervasive social 
rules tort law enforces are at the core of notions of obligation and injury cognizable at law. 
For a critical discussion of law as coercive ordering, see, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976); John Hasnas, Back 
to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss 
the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84 (1995). 
72. See, e.g., Larry Cam Backer, Raping Sodomy and Sodomizing Rape: A Morality Tale 
About the Transformation of Modem Sodomy Jurisprudence, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 37 (1993). 
73. See, e.g., KATHRYN EDIN, THERE'S A LOT OF MONTH LEFT AT THE END OF THE 
MONEY: How WELFARE RECIPIENTS MAKE ENDS MEET IN CHICAGO (1993); William H. 
Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983). 
Consider the stories in THERESA FUNICIELLO, TYRANNY OF KINDNESS: DISMANTLING THE 
WELFARE SYSTEM TO END POVERTY IN AMERICA 16-17 (1993). 
74. See, e.g., Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare 
Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 741-46 (1992) (demonization of welfare mothers 
through the structure of current welfare diverts attention from the failure of the economy to 
provide for the needs of all people); cf CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN 
SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980, at 154 (1984) (welfare law creates incentive to sloth and ought 
to be reformed to induce good conduct); PRA WO §§ 101 (1 )-(2) ("Marriage is the foundation 
of a successful society. Marriage is an essential institution of a successful society .... ") . 
lWikiiL 
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group norm enforcement. 75 Like the culture, the unconscious enforcement 
of group norms operates everywhere. It is internalized in the actions of all 
group members. It governs even the least significant action or habit; it 
exhausts resistance. 76 It is meant as an automatic, constant, endless 
reaffirmation of the strength and integrity of the group. They are particular-
ly strong when core behavioral norms are affected,77 or when intergroup 
status is challenged.78 Women, and especially poor women, are forced to 
conform to dominant social norms by a group social pressure almost more 
compelling than the "black letter" of the pharisaic pronouncements of law 
and regulation. 79 To ignore the pressure, to resist assimilation, is to 
declare independence from the group-to fall outside of it, to participate in 
"outlaw culture," and to accept the consequences of such action.80 For 
example, the "work requirements imposed on mothers who receive welfare 
'work' in the sense of expressing and perpetuating negative views about 
75. See generally ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 37 at 362; FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, 
supra note 15; Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics 
of Race, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1183, 1199-1200 (1993) (reviewing RICHARD EpSTEIN, 
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992)); 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 1 05 YALE L.J. 1563 
(1996) (reviewing LINDA GoRDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE 
HISTORY OF WELFARE; JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM 
UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY); Eleanor Marie Brown, Note, The Tower of Babel: 
Bridging the Divide Between Critical Race Theory and "Mainstream" Civil Rights 
Scholarship, 105 YALE L.J. 513 (1995); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363 
(1992). 
76. Yvonne Cherena Pacheco has illustrated how even the naming patterns of our culture 
- personal identification within a group - is enforced informally even when no formal 
enforcement mechanism exists. Professor Cherena Pacheco considered the way in which 
unofficial conduct acts to suppress the use of Latin naming patterns in favor of our own. 
"The United States' tradition of one surname is so well entrenched that any deviation from 
it is unfamiliar and alien; it is immediately deemed awkward and odd, and subtle - but 
pervasive and quite powerful - forces will operate to change it." Yvonne M. Cherena 
Pacheco, Latino Surnames: Formal and Informal Forces in the United States Affecting the 
Retention and Use of the Maternal Surname, 18 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 15 (1992). 
77. Certainly this is one of the lessons we can draw from the work of modem feminists. 
See, e.g., Law, supra note 46. 
78. The recognition that unconscious assimilative forces are particularly strong when 
intergroup status is challenged is among the most significant contributions of the scholarship 
of critical race theorists for my analysis. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh 
Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 61 (1996). 
79. Consider the perspectives of people who live with the consequences of social policy 
in FuNICIELLO, supra note 73. Traditionalists discovered the power of social pressure about 
a generation ago and have used it to their advantage ever since. See, e.g, GEORGE GILDER, 
MEN AND MARRIAGE (1992) (on the importance of enforcing customary sexual norms to 
reduce poverty and social deviance). 
80. See, e.g., Monica J. Evans, Stealing Away: Black Women, Outlaw Culture and the 
Rhetoric of Rights, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 263 (1993) (regarding the benefits and 
detriments from the perspective of the object of the dominant group assimilative force). 
AMUSW*5MfiW· 4+#&+& ii' eWF 'e' 
Summer 1996] BY HOOK OR BY CROOK 411 
poor people, single mothers, and African-Americans."sl This is nothing 
new.S2 
And what of dissent in this scheme--conduct which does not conform 
to cultural norms? Tolerance of difference is built into the system. That, 
perhaps, helps explain the survival power of our core cultural norms. Our 
dominant culture accepts the notion that it can never be completely 
effectuated, and so it provides vehicles for the management of its own 
imperfection. Dissent is the expression of the failure to fully inculcate 
group norms within a targeted population. Toleration is the name we give 
to a necessary cultural safety valve; toleration advances political stability 
and permits social modulation within the parameters of underlying basic 
social conventions (which I described earlier as they touch on welfare 
reform). Dissent is tolerated because, like the difference between venial and 
mortal sin, some cultural taboos are more important than others. 
Efficiency in a world of limited resources militates against strict 
enforcement of dominant norms in most societies. The larger and more 
complex the society, the less likely enforcement can be either constant or 
uniform. Society will tum a blind eye where it can (when it can afford to). 
More importantly, perhaps, social rules do not invariably result in a unitary 
interpretation of conduct norms, even core norms. To the extent ambiguity 
exists and will not interfere with core social norms, variation will be 
tolerated. Both interpretative efficiency and enforcement resources vary 
over time. 
Beyond variation from interpretive ambiguity and de minimis violation 
of taboo, society will tolerate no deviation without punishment. Dissent is 
subversive; it is deviance of a kind which might threaten to substitute an 
orthodoxy of deviance for that of the current standard. Dissent is guarded, 
it is analyzed, and it is catalogued. Dissent is tolerated to the extent it is 
judged not to be dangerous. It is otherwise suppressed with an exquisitely 
complex palette of forms, as the papers presented in this Symposium 
illustrate. It is in this world that society considers its institutional response 
to the poor. 
For the academic, especially, the assimilation imperative of dominant 
groups has other consequences as well, which the papers presented at this 
Symposium readily demonstrate. Politically credible liberal or conservative 
programs must remain true to the same singular set of basic assumptions 
about how society ought to work and what it ought to expect from 
81. Martha Minow, The Welfare o/Single Mothers and Their Children, 26 CONN. L. REv. 
817,838 (1994). 
82. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE 
NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992) (noting parallels in the means used to interpret and enforce social 
behavior norms at the tum of the 19th and 20th centuries). 
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individuals. 
Equality of tolerance becomes abstract, spurious. With the actual 
decline of dissenting forces in the society, the opposition is 
insulated in small and frequently antagonistic groups who, even 
where tolerated within the narrow limits set by the hierarchical 
structure of society, are powerless while they keep within these 
limits. But the tolerance shown them is deceptive and promotes 
coordination. And on the firm foundations of a coordinated society 
all but closed against qualitative change, tolerance itself serves to 
contain such change rather than to promote it.83 
What Herbert Marcuse never realized, however, and what I have been 
arguing especially in the world of poor relief, is that it has always been so. 
What Marcuse sees as decline is better understood as change in the manner 
in which toleration is expressed in society. No society tolerates radical 
dissent if that society means to survive. Such dissent will either be co-
opted or destroyed.84 In this process, the assimilation imperative serves 
society well. The thrust of this imperative is to subordinate, as a matter of 
necessity, individuals and groups who are judged system-threatening, as 
such judgments are made from generation to generation. This subordination 
is the way in which toleration is tempered by assimilation, even as 
toleration tempers conformity. 
This last notion can be reiterated to make a related point: radical 
dissent is usually not viewed merely as such. Subversion has a specific 
purpose-to replace one dominant group of people with another. This is 
so whether the normative structure on which the dominant group rests 
resembles that of the replaced group or not. Dissent is political; it is a 
dialogue of power. 85 People, and especially groups, tend to use power 
narrowly, primarily for their own benefit. We readily accept that notion as 
a characteristic of dominant groups (thus the idiom of subordination in 
"outsider" scholarship); it applies equally, and perhaps with more force, to 
83. Marcuse, supra note 69, at 116. 
84. Consider the observation of Professor Richard Delgado: "There is actually a body of 
emerging writing that says empathy only goes so far, that we cannot identify with or love 
anyone who is too different from us, cannot resonate to a . story' too unlike the one we 
usually hear." Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle: Care, Competition, and the 
Redemptive Tragedy of Race, 81 CAL. L. REv. 387,413 (1993). 
85. Consider the dialogue for the power of influence - voice. See Richard Delgado & 
Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression 
Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1284-88 (1992) (explaining that 
a free market of racial depiction resists change because the dominant-group-generated 
pictures of the subordinated group are usually negative, and that these negative pictures are 
internalized by both the dominant and the subordinated group, creating an atmosphere in 
which, when the subordinated group speaks, they have little credibility). 
Summer 1996] BY HOOK OR BY CROOK 413 
"outsider" groups. As parochial groups (at best) within a dominant culture, 
outsiders are easily caricatured not as the harbingers of universal change, 
but rather as the heralds of a new feudal society. They are today's version 
of the Jews in medieval Poland, where, within the same macro-political unit 
and the same physical space (the Kingdom of Poland), the Christian and 
Jewish peoples occupied different metaphysical spaces, remaining culturally 
separate and physically segregated (on a macro level), and each dominant 
within their own sphere (though not necessarily equal).86 
B. ON THE OPTIMAL MIX OF CONFORMITY AND TOLERANCE 
The give and take of assimilation and tolerance in our poor law theory 
ultimately produces only small movements between acceptable alterna-
tives.87 These movements look large to us because we have internalized 
the limited vision of the possible. Our political institutions are incapable 
of accepting the real possibility of alternatives which violate core social 
taboos. These taboos define our world. Thus, we can talk about the great 
gulf between the Republican approach in PRA WO, the approach of the 
architects of the Great Society, and the approaches described in this 
Symposium. But, from a higher altitude, the apparent differences seem 
small indeed. In this section, I will demonstrate that each of the very 
different papers presented in this Symposium evidences both an allegiance 
to the core normative imperatives of conformity and toleration, and to the 
possibility of difference between the approaches within that normative 
structure against which most commentators claim to struggle. These 
allegiances explain why the great gulf that exists between the papers 
presented here is far narrower than one would expect and why this must be 
so. 
The interplay between tolerance and assimilation can occur because of 
the interpretive potential of our core socio-cultural structural conduct norms. 
These rules do not prescribe an optimal set of behaviors. Rather, they allow 
for a range of possibility within which the group can identify. It is in this 
86. See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA (1991); 
RICHARD 1. HERRENSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND 
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). But this is not merely the nightmare of 
traditionalists like Schlesinger. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRUL Y DISADVANTAGED: 
THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); ANDREW HACKER, Two 
NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 61 (1992). Western political 
units do not have a happy history with this sort of politically sanctioned polyculturalism (not 
that this is unique to the West). Poland (in the period of the Second World War), Spain 
(during the sixteenth century), and the region formerly known as Yugoslavia (during the 
1990's) provide examples of the fragility of polyculturalism and the violence with which it 
can be flushed out of a dominant cultural system. 
87. See Backer, Essay: Poor Relief, Welfare Paralysis and Assimilation, supra note 4, 
(discussing the nature of the theoretical constraints of welfare theory in the U.S.). 
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sense that the core assumptions of the dominant culture act as a meta-
system. Culture contains within it all possibilities and all combinations 
conceivable given the set of basic assumptions which define a group as 
"distinct." The core rules provide the box within which any particular 
expression of group norms is implemented and reimplemented as popular 
culture, over and over again. 88 Beyond culture is outside--the inconceiv-
able. Within culture is an infinite variation. 89 "Outside" carries multiple 
meanings--it can describe alternatives, and it can define the inconceivable. 
Each iteration of culture negates the other possibilities. In this sense, each 
of them is outside--the "other." Yet, all are possible at some time or other, 
and in some form or other, without compromising the culture from which 
all spring. None of the iterations implicate the "other" as outside 
culture--as not culture. Though known through the writing of academics 
and others, arguments for change which compromise culture, as a practical 
matter, are excluded, denied, and concealed. This limitation does not 
necessarily confine the choices we believe are available within the 
boundaries of dominant culture. We can choose to persecute or ignore 
88. Popular culture is the way in which we replicate culture. In this sense, culture serves 
as a meta-system, immutable in its totality, yet preserving a certain indeterminacy and 
fluidity, a certain play in its expression. As such, popular culture, the temporal expression 
of culture, represents merely an implementation of the possibilities inherent within culture, 
not the totality of the possibilities of culture itself (an impossibility); we practice culture 
through endless attempts at applying the normative rules of that culture. It is in this sense, 
precisely that of temporal fluidity within an undergirding meta-system, that I speak of 
popular culture. In the context of alternative visions of the welfare state within the confines 
of American political "culture," Herbert McClosky and John Zaller have made the point that 
"[w]hen the norms are contested, individuals adopt, from the range of alternatives being 
argued among opinion leaders, those attitudes that best reflect their own ideological 
tendencies." HERBERT MCCLOSKY & JOHN ZALLER, THE AMERICAN ETHOS 262 (1984); see 
also id. at 161-88 (on the conflict between the core parameters of "democracy" and 
"capitalism" which the authors suggest shapes and reshapes the optimal American system 
of political economy). 
89. Popular culture is the way in which we selectively and collectively evidence culture 
in practice. We practice popular culture through a filtered power/politics. Popular culture 
is always in conflict with its alternative forms, and its iterations and reiterations depend on 
the power of norm-influencing groups to impose a particular order of things. Popular culture 
is always selective because popular expression cannot at anyone time reflect all of the 
possible forms of cultural expression; we necessarily discriminate among the possibilities. 
In this sense the possibilities of culture are evidenced over generations. It is collective 
because it necessarily expresses the domination of a particular way of practicing culture. 
In this sense, I find Bourdieu's notion of induced misunderstanding ironic: "miscognition 
is structurally necessary for the reproduction of the social order, which would become 
intolerably conflicted without it." Richard Terdiman, Translator's Introduction, 38 
HASTINGS LJ. 805, 813 (1987) (translating Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward A 
SOCiology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 814). From this perspective of popular 
culture, Derrida's "Other" can exist both within culture and outside of it. Derrida's notion 
that the "other" provides the definition or marks the space of the outside is perhaps far too 
limiting. Cf JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 30 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 
1976) (describing writing as the "outside"). 
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unproductive women with small children who conceive outside of marriage, 
we can pay them to raise their children, we can take their children away, we 
can celebrate their independence, and persecute their sexual partners. All 
of this we can do within our culture--any of these will do--all have been 
done and will be done again.90 
There is the problem for welfare reform and its rhetoric. We search for 
permanence and the immutable. We believe that there exists the one 
answer, the formulation of which, when implemented, will see society 
through its "problem" for all time. Discussion of welfare reform is much 
like a rhetoric in search of God. But there is no ultimate, immutable, and 
permanent relationship between tolerance and conformity. Setting the 
contours of that relationship requires the infusion of value-that is, the 
value of tolerance of particular actions or states of being relative to the 
value of conformity to majority norms. Valuation also suggests the societal 
importance of that variable (tolerance/conformity) in its own right, as well 
90. Frances Fox Piven recently underscored the changeability, within the limited 
parameters of our core social norms, of welfare reform in a recent editorial condemning the 
enactment of the federal welfare reforms of 1996. 
Eminent English social thinkers developed a justification for an 1834 law 
that eliminated relief for the poor. Learned arguments showed that giving 
them even meager quantities of bread and coal harmed both the larger 
society and the poor themselves. 
The misery and reduced life spans that ensued were well-documented not 
only by historians but ultimately by Parliament, which investigated the 
workhouses and the riots against them. England came to learn that the 
theory that relief itself caused poverty was wrong, and replaced the Poor Law 
with a modem system of social assistance. 
No matter what England learned, the United States Government is eagerly 
following the 1834 script by ending Federal responsibility for welfare and 
turning it over to the states. The arguments are the same .... 
We may have to relive the misery and moral disintegration of England in the 
19th century to learn what happens when a society deserts its most 
vulnerable members. 
Frances Fox Piven, From Workhouse to Workfare, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at A27. For 
a discussion of the history of the idea of poor relief in Britain at the time of the enactment 
of the New Poor Law in the nineteenth century, see GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE IDEA OF 
POVERTY: ENGLAND IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL AGE 147-76 (1984). For a discussion of 
the history of poor relief in this country, see MICHAEL KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: 
FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE (1989). For a description of 
common approaches to the ways in which behavioral norms traditionally have been enforced 
in English speaking countries, see, e.g., ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 37, at 358-62; Jacobus 
tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present 
Status, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257 (1963-64). 
416 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:2 
as relative to other variables which may be factored into a decision. 
These values are grounded in the normative restraints of our culture. 
As such, values do not exist, finite and substantially immutable. Valuation 
reflects a judgment of the way in which our social norms ought to be 
interpreted at any given moment; and this interpretation can change from 
moment to moment. Even if our valuation originates in a Divine source (or 
the twentieth-century reasonable equivalent of Truth), its application 
requires the interpretation of the infinitely ambiguous.91 Regardless, the 
way in which we infuse societal variables with meaning or value provides 
the engine of change for altering the societal consensus of what is "best" for 
the group. However, that alteration is always limited to the space permitted 
by our paradigmatic parameters. 
We sometimes call the process of valuing "politics." Consider the 
explanations for the January 1996 veto of the conservative Republican 
welfare reform bill (PRAWO), and its resurrection six months later as 
PRAWORA. "[W]hat has changed since the Senate acted is not the bill but 
the politics of the situation,,,92 Republicans having moved beyond what the 
average voter thinks of as welfare.93 
What happened in my view is that the issue became politicized. 
Welfare symbolizes to the public what they think has gone wrong 
with our society. It symbolizes the decline in responsibility for 
supporting yourself and your children, the failure of parents to act 
responsibly, the decline of the work ethic. It is an easy target. 
But there was a backlash because the proposals did go too far. 
91. What, after all, does toleration or confonnity mean? Implicit in the definition is a 
judgment of the appropriateness of one definition over another more or less similar to the 
one chosen, anyone of which could be chosen the next time the question of meaning is 
posited. This is the nature of hermeneutics in an original sense - the science and 
methodology of interpretation, especially of the Bible. 
92. Judith Havemann, The End of Welfare as We Might Have Known It? Congress and 
Clinton Came Close, But Don't Hold Your Breath Waiting for It to Happen, WASH. POST 
NAT'L WKLY. ED., Jan. 22-28, 1996, at 33 (quoting Douglas Beshaov, a social policy 
specialist at the conservative American Enterprise Institute). The thrust of the Mr. 
Beshaov's quote applied with even more force when, six months after vetoing PRA WO, 
President Clinton indicated a willingness to sign PRA WORA, a bill substantially similar to 
the rejected measure, and commonly perceived as such. See The Welfare Bill: Dole's 
Statement on the Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at A24 ("Now, as the election nears, 
the President has finally chosen to endorse our welfare refonn bill, a bill so similar to 
legislation that he has already twice vetoed."). '''The President vetoed essentially this same 
bill twice before,' Mr. Inhofe said. 'Clinton stands for nothing, except his own re-election. '" 
Pear, supra note 3, at AI. 
93. Havemann, supra note 92. 
Summer 1996] BY HOOK OR BY CROOK 417 
People generally become concerned about the risks.94 
The effect of valuing (politics and "expediency" in its popular 
manifestations) is that any place within the sphere may be located by giving 
specific values to tolerance (which permits the existence of non-subversive 
deviance) and conformity (which requires assimilation to the core normative 
behavior patterns of the dominant culture).95 The optimum place within 
the sphere will depend on these values. As these values change, so does the 
perception that welfare programs have achieved the optimal relationship 
between tolerance and conformity. Welfare reform which changes the 
balance between tolerance and conformity consists of movements between 
coordinates in the sphere. Movement requires some reweighing of the 
94. Id. (quoting Isabel V. Sawhill, a fonner official in the Clinton Administration). 
Ironically, six months later, the process of political valuing resulted in the President agreeing 
to sign a new version of PRA WOo The Welfare Bill: Text of President Clinton's Announce-
ment on Welfare Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1996, at A24 ("I will sign it into law."). 
President Clinton's statement is telling on this point: "The legislation is, however, far from 
perfect. There are parts of it that are wrong, and I will work - I will address those parts 
in a moment. But on balance, this bill is a real step forward for our country, our values, and 
for people who are on welfare." Id. 
95. Compare the assessments of the recently enacted welfare refonn legislation by the 
editorial staff of the New York Times, stressing the value of toleration: "President Clinton's 
defense ... of his decision to sign an atrocious welfare bill exaggerated its tiny virtues and 
ignored some large faults. . .. It is not fair to cut parents off welfare unless they are 
provided an opportunity to work. It is not humane to remove a Federal guarantee of welfare 
aid . . .. A bill that creates child poverty is not an acceptable way to end welfare as we 
know it." A Sad Day for Poor Children, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. I, 1996, at A16. In contrast, 
stressing the value of confonnity, Senator Nickles (R-OK), expressed the view that: "I think 
welfare had become a way of life for far too many families. And maybe that was their fault, 
maybe it was Congress's fault. I think most of the welfare programs that we've had have 
been well-intentioned, but many of which have had very suspect results." The Welfare Bill: 
Excerptsfrom the Debate in the Senate on the Welfare Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1996, 
at AIO. 
Compare the following assessments of the (liberal) Clinton welfare proposal (W ARA) 
and the (conservative) Republican proposal (PRA WO) the later of which ultimately became 
the basis for the welfare refonns of 1996. See Thomas Brazaitis, Both Sides Assault 
Clinton's Welfare Plan, THE PLAIN DEALER, June IS, 1994, at 14A, (quoting in part Kevin 
M. Aslanian, facilitator of the California-based National Welfare Rights & Refonn Union) 
("The Clinton plan is a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum that 'punishes poor children and families 
and satisfies the hate that some in our society have for the poor. "'); Personal Responsibility 
Act: Hearings on H.R. 4 Before the Committee on Ways and Means, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995) (prepared Statement of Rep. Lynn Woolsey, Jan. 10, 1995) available in LEXIS, 
News Library, Curnws File ("The Personal Responsibility Act cuts off welfare benefits for 
millions of poor children who, through no fault of their own, are born to young unmarried 
mothers."). Cf CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 48, at 65 ("Our Contract will 
achieve what some thirty years of massive welfare spending has not been able to 
accomplish: reduce illegitimacy, require work, and save taxpayers money."); The White 
House, Work and Responsibility Act of 1994: Detailed Summary 30 (June 1994) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) ("the fact remains that welfare dependency 
could be significantly reduced if more young people delayed childbearing until both parents 
were ready to assume the responsibility of raising children"). 
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relative values of each of the variables. Welfare reform becomes radical as 
it approaches, and even pushes the walls of the sphere. But reform never 
pushes through the sphere walls; there are no coordinates corresponding to 
points outside the sphere (although such points must exist, at least in 
theory). That is dangerous space. To locate coordinates outside the sphere 
explodes the sphere boundaries themselves, and substitutes a new set of 
locating parameters in its stead. This is not permitted. '"This is a 
conservative system; it is not easy to make bold changes. ,,96 Indeed, I 
would argue that it is nearly impossible. 
This explains why discussions of welfare conformity and tolerance of 
socio-economic deviance are both perverse and yet paralyzed--why poor 
relief is both mobile and immobile. Consider the nature of the mobility of 
welfare: only a balancing of conformity and tolerance in welfare programs 
which occupy the optimum coordinates are "right" or "good" or "working." 
We think all others are "bad" or "wrong." They have to be, and we can 
prove it. Such programs are a function of a valuation (the importance) 
which we as a society assign the paradigmatic assumptions with which we 
disagree, or with respect to which the "valuation" consensus has shifted. 
It has been demonstrated over and over during the 1994-95 debate over 
PRAWO, and then again during the 1996 debates leading to the passage 
(and the eventual "reluctant" signing) of PRA WORA, that politics is a 
substantially subjective enterprise in setting the optimum balance of 
conformity and tolerance. "Republicans are now directly challenging the 
basic liberal assumption that able-bodied people who don't work and often 
have illegitimate children are entitled to the permanent and guaranteed 
benefits provided by welfare.,,97 Conservatives in Congress have lately 
congratulated themselves on having given significant priority to the power 
of law to compel changes in behavior. 
96. Havemann, supra note 92 (quoting Richard Nathan, of the Rockefeller Institute in 
Albany, New York). But it is a system in which change remains possible and readily 
available within its constraints. 
97. Shaw, supra note 10, at 26. Senator Gramm (R-TX) echoed these sentiments on the 
eve of the passage of the 1996 welfare reform package. 
I think if each of us looks back in our own family to a period where our first 
ancestors came to America or where our families looking back at those who 
have gone before us found themselves poor that we are going to find that 
there are two things that get individuals and that get nations out of poverty. 
Those two things are work and family. And I think it is instructive to note 
that in the last 50 years, those are the two things that we have never applied 
to the welfare program of the United States of America. 
The Welfare Bill: Excerpts from the Debate in the Senate on the Welfare Measure, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1996, at A16. In contrast, Senator Moynihan (D-NY) expressed conclusions 
based on a very different valuation, asserting that the welfare bill was based on the false 
premise that "the behavior of certain adults can be changed by making the lives of their 
children as wretched as possible." Pear, supra note 3, at AI. 
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The recently vetoed PRAWO and its enacted 1996 iteration both speak 
of "the crisis in our Nation." The Republican CQngress asserted that 
"prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancy and out-of-wedlock birth are very 
important Government interests,,,98 which this legislation was intended to 
address. President Clinton provided yet another view: "Taking $60 billion 
in budget cuts and massive structural changes in a variety of pro-
grams . . . is not welfare reform. . . . We must demand responsibility from 
young mothers and young fathers, not penalize children for their parents' 
mistakes.,,99 And commentators articulated yet a different balance: 
The proposals generally reflect the value that it is poor planning, 
bad judgment, an irresponsible lifestyle choice, or generally 
immoral behavior for poor persons to have children they cannot 
support. By refusing to 'reward' welfare recipients for their 
disapproved childbearing choices, the proposals use the club of 
welfare benefits to impose this value choice upon them. The state, 
not the parent, determines whether a welfare recipient should have 
additional children. 100 
For these commentators, then, the focus of the 1994-96 welfare debates in 
98. PRA WO, supra note 3, at § 10 1 (9). This statement was retained substantially 
verbatim in the welfare reform provisions enacted in 1996. See PRAWORA, supra note 3, 
at § 4101(9). 
99. Letter from President Clinton to the House of Representati ves (Jan. 9, 1996) (copy on 
file with author). For similar views, see, e.g., MARY Jo BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, 
WELFARE REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM 143-62 (1994). In announcing his 
decision to sign the 1996 version of PRA WO, President Clinton stated: "I've always 
thought that the Democratic Party should be on the side of creating opportunity and 
promoting empowerment and responsibility for people. And a system that was in place 60 
years ago, that worked for the poverty population then, is not the one we need now." The 
Welfare Bill: Text of President Clinton's Announcement on Welf.'lre Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 1, 1996, at AI0. 
To these comments, perhaps the most appropriate gloss is that of Senator Moynihan (D-
NY) on the passage of PRA WORA and its signing by the very person who had vetoed the 
earlier version: 
We are putting those children at risk with absolutely no evidence that this 
radical idea has even the slightest chance of success .... I have pointed out 
that the principal, and most principled, opponents of this legislation were 
conservative social scientists who for years have argued against liberal 
nostrums for changing society with the argument that no one knows enough 
to mechanistically change society. Typically liberals think otherwise, to the 
extent that liberals can be said to think at all. The current batch is in the 
White House, now busily assuring us they were against this all along, are 
simply lying, albeit they probably don't know they are lying. They have only 
the flimsiest grasp of social reality, thinking all things doable and equally 
undoable. As, for example, the horror of this legislation. 
The Welfare Bill: Excerpts from the Debate in the Senate on the Welfare Measure, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 2, 1996, at Al O. 
100. Barksdale, supra note 11, at 4-5. 
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Congress reflect a limited set of bad choices. Even worse, they represent 
an erroneous interpretation of the ground rules of law memorialized in the 
federal Constitution. 101 Worse than that, they wrongly pathologize non-
conforming poor women. 102 However, the current choice would not 
necessarily pathologize the need for conformity at some other (optimal) 
level. "Certainly, some governmental means to discourage socially 
troublesome behavior should be permissible.,,103 
I emphasize that the movements within the matrix of our socio-cultural 
substructure, which must pass for welfare reform in this country, are not 
mere patriarchal politics, although that exists. 104 Nor are they anything 
more than an unworkable ballet for the entertainment of the masses, a mere 
fantasy based on the duality "us" (good) and "them" (bad), though there is 
much of that as well. lOS Nor are these movements anything more than a 
conscious/unconscious attempt to subordinate non-white peoples in the 
United States, though that certainly has followed from traditional forms of 
relief. 106 Rather, each movement represents another iteration and expres-
sion of what we consider to be the better configuration of the values which 
make up our culture. Each finds its expression in policy, formally through 
law. 107 Each movement serves as a validation of the underlying system 
101. /d.; see also Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, 1 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 340 
(1994). 
102. See, e.g., FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 15. 
103. Barksdale, supra note 11, at 61. Cf CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL 
POLICY: RACE, POVERTY AND THE UNDERCLASS (1992); Moynihan, supra note 32, at 17-26. 
104. For this argument, see, e.g., Law, supra note 46; Martha Fineman, Images of Mothers 
in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE LJ. 274. See generally FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, 
supra note 15. 
105. For a discussion of the notion that welfare reform is basically an exercise in the 
unworkable, see JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION 
OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 7, 11, 16-17 (1991); Backer, Of Handouts 
and Worthless Promises, supra note 2, at 1058-70. For a discussion of the social fantasy 
aspects of the welfare debate, see Marty M. Slaughter, Fantasies: Single Mothers and 
Welfare Reform 95 COLUM. L. REv. 2156,2179-88 (1995) (reviewing MARTHA ALBERTSON 
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TwENTIETH CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES (1995)). 
106. See, e.g., Williams, supra, note 76; Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers' 
Work, 26 CONN. L. REv. 871 (1994). For a powerful argument that racism is a substantial 
force in shaping poor relief policy in the United States, see JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR 
OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994). 
107. And our law is necessarily blind to patriarchy, racism, and other means of directly or 
indirectly subordinating or marginalizing people whose membership in the dominant group 
is either contingent on conduct or only fragmentary (for instance formal membership in the 
polity but not in the dominant society). On the blindness of the law from the perspective 
of the "other" see, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind, " 44 
Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1991); cf Robert A. Williams, Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils 
and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 LAW & lNEQ. 1. 103 (1987). 
Our core (internalized) assumptions of the way our social ordering must work presuppose 
racial, ethnic, and gender neutrality, but not because such neutrality exits. Rather, the 
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which it replicates and implements. Welfare reform always work~it is 
confirmation of the identity of society and affirmation of the value of its 
underlying structure. 
In this sense, I quarrel with Professor Slaughter's application of 
Lacanian fantasy theory to poor relief reform. That application, fundamen-
tally sound as far as it goes, misunderstands the utility of change in our 
normative universe. Professor Slaughter sees welfare and its reform in 
terms of the incoherence and incompleteness of society. In contrast, 
Lacanian theory falls into the trap of political theory, equating apparent 
instability for incoherence and fragility. When it is applied, not to 
particularizable groups--like the Jewish people of fact or fantasy-but to 
conduct norms involving state fiscal responsibility, Lacanian theory requires 
a sort of inward imperialism in order to stave off eventual collapse. I08 
Both the need for social conformity and the disagreements about the 
optimal mix of conformity and tolerance are well demonstrated by several 
of the papers presented in this Symposium, as well as some of the 
comments. I will focus on the very different approaches presented at this 
Symposium by Neil Gilbert, Tanya Broder and Clara Luz Navarro, Joanna 
Weinberg and Mark Aaronson. 
Neil Gilbert's article illustrates a significant valuing of socio-cultural 
conformity. It demonstrates the ways in which welfare reform can be used 
as an important vehicle for the assimilation of deviant groups. Professor 
Gilbert's article also evidences the effect of the acceptance of poverty as 
ineradicable on policy implementation primarily because it is an expression 
of individual will. Such an acceptance carries with it the portentous 
corollary notion that absent the control of free will (a taboo that will not 
easily be overcome in our culture), there may always exist a group of socio-
cultural deviants for whom social institutions will have to care. 
The portentousness of this corollary notion is evidenced by the 
substructure does not register the possibility of the absence of neutrality and its effect on the 
burden of governmental relief. Productivity is the key, not productivity maximization; we 
remain blind to other possibilities. Racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, and heterosexism are 
merely impediments to full productivity-they do not affect a person's ability to be at least 
minimally productive. Thus, Lawrence Mead can insist that African-American forms of 
resistance to racism, the expression of "hostility by devious refusals to cooperate, a passivity 
that infuriates whites-as it is intended to-without challenging them directly," MEAD, supra 
note 27, at 157, makes them far more "vulnerable to poverty," id. at 148, amounting to a 
deliberate secession from the culture and social life of the nation as a whole, which "is no 
less threatening to the country than the more formal rupture of 1861." Id. at 246. See also 
MURRAY, supra note 28, at 156-62 (discussing hypothetical couple, Harold and Phyllis). 
108. Slaughter, supra note 105, at 2179-82. It fails to appreciate the value and permanence 
of states of change as an instrument of stability and coherence in/act. For what we see with 
the permanent state of rhetorical welfare reform is the display of changing popular 
manifestations of underlying, and unchanging, norms. Welfare reform reflects popular (not 
political) culture. See supra notes 88-89. 
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programs which such ideas generate-programs inevitably based on 
suggestions of containment and instruction. Thus, Professor Gilbert's 
approach is eminently reasonable once within the framework of the 
normative values which animate it. For Professor Gilbert, assimilation is 
valued well over deviance. Deviance is permitted; but to the extent the 
state is expected to intervene financially, deviance must be both contained 
and controlled. The deviance of which we speak here is deviance with 
economic effect--deviance which reduces productivity. Deviance in its 
other forms may well be a matter of indifference. 
The core of Professor Gilbert's proposal is based on an underlying 
value determination that assimilation and substantial core social conformity 
are the most important factors in reducing the likelihood of long term 
dependence on institutional relief. The key to his proposal lies in the 
determination that poor people have to be treated differently based on their 
level of acculturation. Welfare must distinguish between classes of welfare 
recipients. The separation is based on the extent to which a woman has 
demonstrated socio-cultural assimilation and conformity. 109 The proxy 
Professor Gilbert uses for determining the assimilative potential of recipients 
is past behavior patterns. Motivation and competence can be presumed 
when recipients have been "independent citizens abiding by social 
conventions."llo For this group, the benefits of the current system, at 
least for two years, is in order. They can be expected to get their lives 
organized and become productive in a short amount of time. III 
Lack of motivation and socio-cultural incompetence can be presumed 
from conduct evidencing non-conformity with social conventions. The 
social convention Professor Gilbert highlights is out-of-wedlock pregnan-
cy.ll2 For the group exhibiting this trait, work incentives are not viable 
because women (and especially young women) who bear children out-of-
wedlock can be presumed to have neither the social nor educational skills 
109. The separation into two groups is based on the commonly cited data: 48% of AFDC 
spells last less than two years (including 70% of initial spells), but at anyone time about 
50% of recipients are in the midst of a spell lasting more than eight years. The result, of 
course, is that while the typical recipient receives aid only for a short period of time, at any 
one time a large number of recipients are in the midst of a long term spell on welfare. 
Gilbert, Welfare Reform, supra note 16, at 333-34. The formal basis on which Professor 
Gilbert would separate classes of recipients is based on notions of the socio-economic 
competence and motivation (eagerness to conform to dominant group norms) of the 
recipients. [d. at 334-35. 
110. [d. at 334. Because Professor Gilbert presumes that this group is motivated and 
competent, he would expect a high proportion of short spell recipients to be in this group. 
This is the group which normally takes advantage of the current programs' perverse 
incentive to cream, and on whom far too much poor relief money is needlessly wasted. 
111. [d. at 334-35. 
112. See id. at 335. This may also serve as a proxy for other social dysfunctions, all of 
which together may make holding a job unrealistic. [d. at 336-37. 
9 , ; 
Summer 1996] BY HOOK OR BY CROOK 423 
to get and keep a job. For them, a long term program of acculturation and 
assimilation is more appropriate, if only to save their children. 
The proposed program of acculturation is divided into two phases. The 
first involves supervision of mother and child by caseworkers with the 
power to remove mother and child to more closely supervised environments 
for the protection of the child. I J3 Phase two is particularly interesting in 
terms of its fidelity to the structural importance of conformity as well as to 
core dominant group notions of cost savings and fraud containment. In the 
second phase, recipients emerge as "wards of the state" rather than 
"temporary dependents."Il4 According to Professor Gilbert, while phase 
two might raise costs initially, welfare recipients themselves could perform 
the role of caseworker in phase one and thereby mitigate a substantial part 
of the expense of this program. 115 Moreover, the real effect of abandon-
ing punitive provisions for non-conformity in favor of substantial public 
monitoring of the conduct of this portion of the recipient population will be 
a reduction in overall costs by limiting fraud.IJ6 
There is no expectation that recipients in a "phase two" environment 
will ever escape the supervision of the state. The inevitable existence of the 
permanent poverty of these deviants must be accepted. "[W]elfare did not 
create this unhealthy pattern of behavior, and forces larger than those 
generated by welfare reform will be required to eliminate it." 11 7 Phase 
two recipients constitute a population that will remain wards of the 
state--treated like children until they "grow Up.,,1I8 In other words, by 
113. Interestingly, this echoes William Simon's suggestions for a return to a more 
professionalized view of the work of social workers in the delivery of welfare benefits. See 
William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REv 1 
(1985). I suspect, however, that the nature ofthe monitoring advocated by Professor Gilbert 
is different from that Professor Simon had in mind. 
114. Gilbert, Welfare Reform, supra note 16, at 336. Phase two involves the supervision 
provided under phase one and, in addition, assigns to each recipient a caseworker with 
significant control over the recipient's family finances. Additionally, phase two provides for 
increased monitoring of outside resources which can be used to decrease the amount of the 
AFDC payment available to the recipient. There is an echo here of the notion that as long 
as people can choose not to work, as long as behavioral norms provide incentives to idleness 
(or an inability to find and maintain a job), poverty will exist. Cf MEAD, NEW POLITICS 
OF POVERTY, supra note 27, at 259-61 (on the author's version of human nature). 
115. Gilbert, Welfare Reform, supra note 16, at 336. 
116. Id. at 337. 
117. Id. at 337. Contrast the suggestion by COH of the forces necessary to eliminate this 
problem. See White, supra note 63. The difference, of course involves differences in the 
relative valuing of conformity and the danger of tolerance of deviance. 
118. Ironically, this more humane means of open-ended aid for the "helpless" (socio-
culturally speaking) recalls the period of welfare provision prior to the welfare rights 
revolution of the 1960s, when caseworkers actively supervised the morals and conduct of 
the recipient population. It would be interesting to speculate on whether phase two 
supervision might not spark the same kind of reaction to and mobilization against it by the 
recipient population as the old intrusive discretionary system of welfare. For a sample of 
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classifying them as children and their socio-cultural deviations from the 
dominant group norm as child-like, we add to the normative mode of 
appropriate 'adult' or 'mature' behavior, and reinforce the informal power 
of dominant norms. This is new only in the sophistication of the way in 
which the approach will classify the poor; it reflects traditional patterns of 
affirmance (of norms) and enforcement (of compliance). 
Very different is the approach described by Tanya Broder and Clara 
Luz Navarro, in a paper responding to immigrant baiting in the context of 
a number of legislative proposals, at the federal and state level, to severely 
limit benefits to the immigrant population in the United States. I 19 On the 
surface, one should conclude that this paper rejects all conventional (and 
certainly currently fashionable conservative) notions of welfare reform and 
the scapegoating of immigrants. 12o And yet, this paper, in its own way 
the scholarly criticism of the old discretionary approach, see, e.g., KENNETH C. DAVIS, 
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); Joel F. Handler, Controlling 
Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CAL. L. REv. 479 (1966). But see William 
H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REv 1 (1985) 
(arguing in favor of a more modulated and professionalized form of "helping"). Professor 
Gilbert, however, does not directly address the potential for racism and gender stereotyping 
inherent in intrusive systems of control. In the past, welfare programs have been marred by 
overtones of direct and indirect racism and gender stereotyping, especially intrusive welfare 
programs involving social worker intervention at the federal and the state level. Where the 
reality of participation indicates that such a class will consist substantially of women, and 
disproportionately women of color, the impact on the personal lives of the recipient class is 
especially significant. See LINDA GORDON PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS 
AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935, at 209-51 (1994) (describing the feminist reform 
efforts of the early part of the twentieth century which laid the foundations for New Deal 
welfare programs, and examining the patriarchal norms of women's place in the social order 
which infused such reform efforts); QUADAGNO, supra note 106 (exploring the racist basis 
of the dismantling of the poverty programs of the 1960s). It is not clear how Professor 
Gilbert's monitoring program can protect itself against these dangers, nor is it clear that such 
programs can avoid conformity to underlying norms which incorporate notions of preferred 
gender roles and race hierarchies. 
119. See generally Broder & Navarro, supra note 14. 
120. PRAWO and PRAWORA punish immigrants in a variety of respects. Each reflects 
a belief, not universally shared, that immigrants cause the "problems" of welfare in the 
United States. The policy underlying the restrictions are set out in the statute itself. For 
example, see PRA WO, supra note 3, at §§ 400-41. PRA WO § 400, states that while self-
sufficiency has been the basic principle of immigration law in the United States, aliens have 
been applying for public relief at increasing rates. "It is a compelling government interest 
to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public 
benefits." Id. at § 400(6). Current eligibility rules make enforcement of basic immigration 
policy difficult and must be changed. Id. at § 400(4)-(5). Except for a small number of 
emergency programs, and programs designed to prevent the spread of communicable diseases 
to the population, undocumented aliens (defined negatively as not a "qualified alien") are 
entitled to no federal benefits. See id. at § 431. Qualified aliens are entitled to limited 
benefits, id. at §§ 402-403, and states are given authority to eliminate most state benefits to 
non-"qualified aliens," id. at § 411, and to limit the benefits to qualified aliens. Id. at § 412. 
Mindful of the benefits of cost shifting, PRA WO would have amended the Immigration and 
Nationality Act to make sponsorship agreements fully enforceable as contracts. Id. at § 423. 
-E 
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is as norm affirming as Professor Gilbert's. Ms. Broder and Ms. Navarro 
clearly value the freedom of dissent, perhaps to a greater extent than it is 
valued for Professor Gilbert's socio-economic deviants. 121 But this is 
valuing within the confines of conventional norms. "As the testimony of 
the women interviewed for this article will demonstrate, immigrants come 
here to work, join their families, create a better life for their children, and 
flee persecution in their homelands, not to seek welfare benefits.,,122 This 
conformist valuation is especially apparent in the eloquent pleas of the 
women profiled in the study for the extension to them of dominant group 
norms and institutional programs of protection against domestic violence 
and gender discrimination. 123 
The dissent valued by Ms. Broder and Ms. Navarro is cultural 
dissent; 124 but this is a notion long internalized in the United States. 125 
The purpose is to pennit recovery by state officials of benefits paid to "qualified aliens." 
See 141 CONGo REc. H. 15435 (Dec. 21, 1995) (Conference Committee report). PRA WORA 
retains a number of similar provisions affecting immigrants. See PRA WORA, supra note 3, 
at §§ 400-435. See also Highlights: Changes in Welfare, N.Y. TIMEs, July 31, 1996, at 
A9. 
121. Broder & Navarro, supra note 14, at 282-83. 
122. Id. at 282. 
123. See id. at 286-88. Thus, the assimilative allure of American notions of appropriate 
male-female relations has attracted some of the women interviewed for the study away from 
the cultural nonns of their countries of birth, at least to some extent. But, contrast the 
expressed desire for protection from domestic violence with the embrace of traditional latin 
patriarchy. See infra note 128 (nonns expressed in the material quoted). This highlights the 
state of cultural contradiction of immigration and the intercultural tension in which Latina 
women may live. For a sensitive illustration of the tensions, see Margaret E. Montoya, 
Mascaras, Trenzas, y Grefias: Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and 
Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 185 (1994). See also Leslie G. Espinoza, Multi-
Identity: Community and Culture, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & CULTURE 23 (1994) 
124. "I want to give them my message, to tell them that just as North Americans are 
human beings with blood flowing from their veins, we Latinos, the same blood flows in us." 
Broder & Navarro, supra note 14, at 312 (quoting Rosa). The valuing of cultural tolerance 
does have political limitations. As such, even among the group which is the subject of the 
BroderlNavarro paper, some cultural dissent is more problematic. 
Some prejudices brought to the United States from the home nations become 
problematic here, at least for some. "In the past, Latinos saw each other differently; we 
discriminated against each other .... In the past we would say, 'aah, those Salvadorans! 
aah, those Mexicans! Always those people, these people.' No longer. Now [after 
Proposition 187] we say our Mexican brothers, our Nicaraguan brothers, our Salvadoran 
brothers. Because that is what we are, brothers." Id. at 306 (quoting Rosa). 
125. The internalization of cultural dissent is theoretically available for all cultures. It is 
also limited for practical purposes as applied to different groups (for example, perhaps, 
African-Americans). Thus, the level of tolerance of cultural difference of immigrant groups 
has risen slowly for most European sub-groups over the course of the last 150 years. 
Consider the anti-Irish and anti-Gennan violence of the last century, and the slow 
internalization of cultural prohibitions of violence against Jews, Italians, and Eastern 
Europeans in the latter part of this century. See, e.g., MILTON GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN 
AMERICAN LIFE: THE ROLE OF RACE, RELIGION, AND NATIONAL ORIGINS (1964). The 
various and quite diverse cultures of Latin America have begun the road down this well 
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It represents a struggle over the definition of group, but a struggle whose 
aim is inclusion within the dominant substructure. If given a chance, it is 
clear that the members of this group, illogically excluded, would quickly 
and successfully join the productive mainstream. 126 No economic deviants 
here. "My hopes? Nothing more than to continue working in this country 
and to demonstrate to people that we came here to work and to forge a 
better future. We didn't come here to be a burden on anyone.,,127 Indeed, 
no social deviance either. Consider the words of Clara Luz Navarro, which 
might well have come from the authors of the Republican Contract with 
America: 
For many Mexican women, family reunification is key. Their 
husbands come to the United States first, leaving the rest of the 
family at home. In all cultures, the family consists at least of the 
father, mother and their children. The ideal is that they can live 
together, grow, and support each other and the children mutually. 
It doesn't work to have pairs separated. This is the goal of many 
women: to come and reunite with their husbands. 128 
Professor Weinberg also argues for inclusion. 129 Professor 
Weinberg's call is not for inclusion of groups, but inclusion of particular 
kinds of labor within the conventional framework of labor markets and the 
value for such work derived therefrom. In a sense, the notion is that 
women, especially who provide caregiving, are productive. 130 They have 
been deprived of the value of their productivity by a system which treats 
women's caregiving work, especially, as invisible. But, she rightly notes, 
worn (and difficult) route in which success is never guaranteed. It is a road that is blocked 
by nativism of both European and non-European peoples already resident. "My son at 
school, feels as if other people of color ... like him less. They tell him that because he is 
undocumented, he doesn't have a right to be here." Broder & Navarro, supra note 14, at 
300 (quoting Irma). 
126. See generally id. at 306-08. 
127. Id. at 306 (quoting Veronica). 
128. Id. at 285-86. Compare the language of the traditionalist Republican Contract With 
America: "The American family is at the very heart of our society. It is through the family 
that we learn values like responsibility, morality, commitment, and faith." CONTRACT WITH 
AMERICA, supra note 48, at 79. "It is the sense of the Congress that marriage is the founda-
tion of a successful society, marriage is an essential social institution which promotes the 
interests of children and society at large. The negative consequences of an out-of-wedlock 
birth on the child, the mother, and society are well documented." PRA WO, supra note 3, 
at § 100(1)-(3); PRAWORA, supra note 3, at § 101(1), (2), and (8). Note also the difficulty 
that modem feminist theorists, like Martha Fineman, might have with what might be 
considered the rigidly conservative and patriarchy-affirming cultural and social aspirations 
of the Latina women whose stories file the pages of Ms. Broder and Navarro's article. See 
FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 15. 
129. See Weinberg, supra note 13. 
130. Id. (manuscript at 20-26). 
•• 
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under our normative system, there ought to be no such thing as free work. 
Free work amounts to unjust exploitation which would be intolerable if, for 
instance, the concept was applied to the work of corporate executives. 131 
In effect, the normative system was on the right track the first time around, 
when caregiving was valued enough that the government agreed to 
supplement the income available to women engaged in this caregiving job 
who had no other sources of income. 132 While some argue that productiv-
ity as a core norm is suspect, or that people ought not to be self-sufficient, 
that is not Professor Weinberg's point. Rather, she illustrates what can be 
characterized as a fundamentally unfair disjunction in the way in which we 
understand our labor markets, the correction of which will reduce its most 
glaring negative effect--the problem of welfare as currently conceived. 
A subtext of Professor Weinberg's approach is one that has been noted 
by other commentators more directly: the effect of women's exclusion 
from the discussion about welfare reform. 
Given the absence of women's voices in the conversation about 
ending welfare . . . the welfare reform consensus (pushing poor 
women into the workforce] misses two important patterns in the 
typical experience of poor women's lives. The first of these 
patterns relates to the complexity of arranging care for children, and 
the second to the gender-specific obstacles that all poor women face 
at work. 133 
As Lucie White notes, women in the welfare reform debates often find 
themselves on the dissenting side of the debate; this exclusion affects the 
social valuing necessary to arrive at a consensus of welfare system 
"optimality." 134 
131. Id. (manuscript at 43-44). "[T]he social structure of relationships, as well as the 
legislative structure of the welfare state, presumes the unpaid labor of female relatives ... 
. " Id. (manuscript at 39). This "interpretation suggests that social policies may need to be 
restructured to provide for compensation for caregiving." Id. (manuscript at 40). On 
attempts at the end of the 19th century to compensate women for their "domestic" 
contributions to the family economy, see Reva B. Siegal, Home as Work: The First 
Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 
1073 (1994). 
132. For a comprehensive description of both the approach and the practical and theoretical 
problems of poor relief for women even at the beginnings of "Aid to Dependant Children", 
see THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF 
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992); Jill Duerr Berrick, From Mother's Duty to 
Personal Responsibility: The Evolution of AFDC, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 257 (1996). 
This is an especially radical approach when applied to African-American women whose 
maternal responsibilities might well have been devalued by the dominant society. See 
Roberts, supra note 106. 
133. White, supra note 63, at 848-49; cf Law, supra note 46. 
134. See White, supra note 63, at 847 & note 17 ("I do suggest that when a public 
conversation is substantially dominated by men, everyday routines that are largely restricted 
¥¥¥riM#M\# Aiii :a:m:. 
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Mark Aaronson argues for what appears to be a radically different 
approach to welfare and income distribution in the United States. 135 To 
Professor Gilbert's more technical criticisms of current welfare reform 
proposals, Professor Aaronson counters with policy and politics. 136 He 
argues that poor relief reform serves to scapegoat the poor and distract and 
discipline the rest of the population.137 Welfare reform neither responds 
to the underlying causes of poverty, nor does it provide adequate subsis-
tence for the poor in an efficient and humane manner. 138 His response to 
these problems is to suggest the establishment of constitutional recognition 
of social rights. 139 Social rights are necessary to protect "individuals, not 
only from arbitrary government, but also from a capricious society and 
economy." 140 We must also "pay the most attention to the structural 
causes of poverty, especially the unavailability of jobs paying a living 
wage.,,141 
Interestingly, the underlying normative goal of Professor Aaronson's 
proposal is the same as that of Professor Gilbert's substantially more 
traditionalist proposal, and echoes the underlying goals of the arguments of 
Professor Weinberg and Ms. Broder and Ms. Navarro. The drive here is 
towards self-sufficiency and personal responsibility-the assimilation into 
the core normative conduct rules of our society. Those goals drive even the 
Republican proposals presenting a far harsher version of what Professor 
Aaronson would see implemented. The difference is the value which 
Professor Aaronson would give to the economic effect of deviance. For 
Professor Aaronson, the negative value of socio-cultural deviance is far 
smaller than the positive value of tolerance. Given the right atmosphere, 
an acceptable level of socio-cultural conformity would be achieved, and that 
to women in our society ... are not likely to weigh very heavily in the conversation."). 
135. See Aaronson, supra note 15. 
136. See id. at 214-17. 
137. [d. at 216. To some extent these notions parallel those developed in the work of 
Piven and Cloward, and Joel Handler. See JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE 
REFORM (1995); HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 105; PlVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 
37. 
138. Aaronson, supra note 15, at 216. 
139. The recent history of this notion goes back at least to the failed attempt to 
constitutionalize the right to welfare in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), in 
which the Supreme Court held that the federal Constitution does not create an entitlement 
(absolute right) to poor relief (subsistence). For a discussion of the utility and possibility 
of constitutionalizing the right to poor relief, see also Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights 
in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659 (1979); but see Ralph K. Winter, 
Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUP. CT. REv. 41 
(1972). 
140. Aaronson, supra note 15, at 219. 
141. Id. Of course, this does not mean that jobs are not available for all able-bodied 
people who want to work. It might more correctly imply a belief in the need for 
governmental intervention to achieve that result. See discussion supra note 28. 
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is all to which society is entitled. In this sense, perhaps, one can appreciate 
the traditional liberal notion that tolerance breeds (minimally necessary) 
conformity. This is so, in part, because the liberal enterprise is not 
concerned as a conscious matter with conformity, in part because the value 
of conformity is low, and in part because the assumption is (at least in the 
context of poor relief theory) that the "problem" is not that poor people do 
not want to conform (become "self-sufficient"), but that they are prevented 
by personal (education, training, life skills) and structural (the unavailability 
of a job paying a living wage, racism, sexism, homophobia) impediments 
which it is the task of government to ameliorate. 
In the end, however, the world envisioned by Professor Aaronson does 
not look much different from that envisioned by Professors Gilbert and 
Weinberg, and Ms. Broder and Ms. Navarro. It is a world of free will, 
where people take responsibility for their lives and devote themselves, to 
the best of their abilities, to the maintenance of themselves and those to 
whom they believe they have an obligation to support. It is a world that 
preserves income inequality, the power of "meritocracy," and the core 
structure of the labor market system. The differences, very real and with 
significant effect on particular individuals in particular ways (ways which 
might be deemed unfair or unwise by some of the papers I discussed), do 
not destroy the ultimate goals. After all, we all live in the same normative 
world whether we like it or not. Understanding that limitation may help us 
better hone our analysis of fairness and the possibilities within the 
constraints of our world order. 
III. Sketching Lessons for Poor Relief: Liberal and Outsider 
Scholarship 
The papers delivered at this Symposium have raised one other 
issue--communication--which I would like to deal with here, at least in a 
very preliminary way. Symposia, articles and the like are meant to engage 
people in dialogue. Each is directed, ultimately, to the society as a whole, 
and each is meant to affect that society in some way. I want to begin to 
explore here the possibilities and limitations of such an attempted discourse. 
The scholarship produced at this Symposium, and, generally, the work 
of activist poor relief scholars as well as both critical race theorists and 
feminist theorists, to a certain extent, have helped expose the coercive 
power of culture and social norms on people, practices, and especially 
law. 142 Their scholarship rightly gives voice to the "other," and to the 
142. See, e.g., GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF 
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992) (exemplifying activist race scholarship); Anthony 
Alfieri, The Antimonies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, XVI 
N.Y.V. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659 (1987-88); Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C. Cahn, The War 
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fairness of extending to all "others" the group dignity which the dominant 
group extends to its own. It is a scholarship which necessarily concentrates 
on the power of the "other," and celebrates its potential ascendancy as a 
result of its exposure of the unfairness and non-neutrality of dominant 
norms and discourse. 
As if the mere exposure of a thing for what one thinks it is can, alone, 
bring fundamental change! By concentrating on the "other," their 
scholarship may misperceive the real underlying strength and vitality of the 
dominant normative substructure that is so discomfiting. On both a political 
and socio-culturallevel, "[0 ]ur political system is a change-resistant system, 
designed by the founders not to move quickly and strongly in new 
directions.,,143 I have tried to illustrate that strength and resilience by 
looking at the papers presented in this Symposium and exposing their 
ultimate obedience to the basic taboos of our culture. To ignore these 
taboos is to fall outside, to be an outlaw. 144 Perversely, to place oneself 
outside dominant group norms both strengthens the conscious identity of the 
"other," and weakens the ability of this "other" to communicate with the 
dominant group. This compounds the incentive to marginalize and 
subordinate non-dominant groups within the metaphysical space occupied 
by the dominant group. Those are the necessary consequences of falling 
outside. 
The scholarship of these theoretical schools presents powerful 
arguments for change based on the long suppressed perspectives· of the 
objects of dominant culture in its various legal guises. As a group, they 
on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 1 D.C. L. REv. 1 (1992). See also Delgado, Rodrigo's 
Second Chronicle, supra note 75 (exemplifying race critical scholarship); Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 
1 (1993); cf Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363 (1992). There is a tremen-
dous amount of feminist literature which touches on the subjects of women and institutional 
relief. Like the feminist movement itself, feminism does not speak with one voice. 
Acknowledging that while many feminist scholars may share in a form of analysis, for the 
purposes of this article, I focus on the normative implications of the analytical framework 
of feminist scholars such as Martha Fineman. See e.g., FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, 
supra note 15. This "categorization" scheme is not meant to be either. The categorization 
is meant for convenience. Consider the work of bridge scholars, such as Dorothy Roberts 
and Lucie White. See, e.g., Roberts, supra; Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare 
Dependency" From a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 1965-67 (1993); Lucie E. White, 
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hean'ng of Mrs. 
G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990); White, supra note 63, at 850. 
143. Havemann, supra note 92 (quoting Richard Nathan, an assistant budget director under 
President Nixon, now a director of the Rockefeller Institute of Government in Albany, New 
York). 
144. On the positive aspect of the outlaw from the perspective of the "other", see, e.g., 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Deviance, Resistance, and Love, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 179, 182 (discuss-
ing the notion of African-Americans as the outlaws of dominant culture, and suggesting that 
deviance sometimes constitutes an act of resistance to the hegemony of the dominant group). 
dA , p" , 
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rationally argue that liberal notions of formal equality and neutral law have 
provided no protection against, and in fact reinforce, the dominant group's 
subordination of the poor, women, and people of color. Critical scholars 
tend to confront dominant culture and its norms as a series of logical 
propositions dependant wholly on the internal logic of their ordering for 
their viability. In this, critical scholars perform the role last played by 
eighteenth century white, male, European Enlightenment rationalists who, 
through reason, sought to overturn the illogical world in which they 
lived. 145 
Although, in so doing, many marginalize (and to some extent demonize) 
the dominant culture against which they battle. How can the value of 
dominant culture, even to its adherents, not be underrated by those who 
have rejected it, the way people reject some God in whom all faith is lost? 
The faith of the converted in the truth of the new covenant necessarily 
blinds the convert to the allure of the old covenant to those not smitten with 
the new. It is natural to minimize the strength of the faith of those "left 
behind." And it is this misunderstanding, this blindness to the faith of the 
dominant culture in the value of their normative substructure that inhibits 
the critical theories of these theoretical schools from being treated as more 
than an academic game. 
I cannot emphasize the point enough: Faith ... faith ... 
faith ... faith . .. faith. The rationalist, Western, Enlightenment oriented 
approaches of critical theory, as well as that of liberal welfare reform 
theorists, underrate the power of faith. Core social norms are not the stuff 
of rationalist exercises. White, patriarchal, European--dominant~ulture 
145. Consider the rationalism inherent in Professor Richard Delgado's culture-subverting 
notion of "race treason." Professor Delgado puts forward the notion that all the dominant 
culture needs to implode is a "few good white men" who, induced to commit continuing and 
fundamental acts of "treason" against the racial ordering foundations of their culture "by 
identifying themselves with blacks when other whites ask for their help in reinforcing white 
supremacy[,] ... would seriously jeopardize the system of white-over-black hegemony that 
has reigned in this country for over four hundred years." Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh 
Chronic/e, supra note 7, at 96-97. The overthrow of a dominating culture (in this case 
racially based) appears so easy. "If the police and courts could not be sure that every person 
who looks white is loyal to the system, that system would fall." Id. at 97. Accord Barbara 
J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of 
DiSCriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 969-79 (1993). 
As a logical proposition this may be true. But the emotive significance of the culture 
is ignored, as is the power of race traitors. See discussion infra notes 166-70. It also seems 
to contradict Professor Delgado's understanding of the conflation of culture and religion. 
See discussion infra note 150. If race treason has had so little success in the African-
American community over the last several centuries at a time when such treason would be 
rewarded, then why should it work any better when attempted by those who would subvert 
the dominant order. For unlike Professor Delgado, I believe that whites as well as blacks 
"know by a kind of instinct that these folks won't be with us when trouble comes down." 
Delgado, supra, at 71. 
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is not a logical exercise. Like the normative framework of the "other," it 
represents a non-rational, emotive ordering. And that is the ultimate blind 
spot of critical theory. All miss an essential point which their delving lays 
bare: dominant culture is both powerful and thinks itself G( 0 )od. There is 
a strong faith in the verities of dominant culture, at least in its core 
configuration. "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you 
free.,,146 I speak here of faith in the classic sense, as something under-
standable to Aquinas,147 as the basis of something as simple and powerful 
as the formal profession of the Catholic Credo,148 and as in the basis of 
fundamental Protestant belief. 149 Professor Delgado, for example, can see 
the intensity, but not the power of that blind(ing) faith. 150 Critical 
theorists of welfare reform forget this faith, they ignore it, at their peril. 
146. John 8:32. 
147. II THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 548-49 (Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans. 1941, Daniel J. Sullivan rev. ed. 1951). 
Faith implies an assent of the intellect to that which is believed. Now the 
intellect assents to a thing in two ways . . .. Secondly, the intellect assents 
to something, not because it is sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper 
object, but through an act of choice, by which it turns voluntarily to one side 
rather than to the other. And if this be accompanied by doubt and fear of the 
opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear 
of the other side, there will be faith. 
ld. at 382-83. This survives in modern form in the Catholic Catechism. See CATECHISM 
OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 27, §176, at 48. 
148. "Communion in faith needs a common language of faith, normative for all and uniting 
all in the same confession of faith." CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 27, 
§ 185, at 51. 
149. See, e.g., JOHN CALVIN, CALVIN: INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, Bk. III, 
ch. II (1559), reprinted in XX THE LIBRARY OF CHRISTIAN CLASSICS 542 (John T. McNeill 
ed. & Ford Lewis Battles trans., 1960). "[W]e hold faith to be a knowledge of God's will 
toward us, perceived from his Word." ld. at 549. "For, as faith is not content with a 
doubtful and changeable opinion, so it is not content with an obscure and confused 
conception; but requires full and fixed certainty, such as men are wont to have from things 
experienced and proved." ld. at 560. "Here, indeed, is the chief hinge on which faith turns: 
That we do not regard the promises of mercy that God offers as true only outside ourselves, 
but not alt all in us; rather that we make them ours by inwardly embracing them." ld. at 
561. This is indeed internalized conviction, absolute, confident, immutable and flowing from 
a source well beyond the power of humankind to command. Such a faith in a socio-cultural 
system cannot be breached by human proof alone. And that is the problem for the 
rationalism of critical scholarship. Rationalist critique must fall on deaf ears since they 
would have the faithful trade faith for something less. As an alternative vision, critical 
analysis assumes the role of competitor. See infra text accompanying note 159. 
150. "It's like a certain type of religiosity. If you believe you are saved, you can easily 
come to believe that you can do no wrong. Because you believe in God, you will believe 
you are God, or at least that you're in tight with Him." Delgado, Rodn'go's Eleventh 
Chronicle, supra note 145, at 78. The irresistible force of faith sustains the drive to 
assimilation of and conformity by the not yet "saved." And yet, Professor Delgado would 
limit the application of its principles to dominant group culture - no others suffer this 
infection. I am not convinced this is so, especially, for example, given the vibrant separatist 
traditions of African-Americans in this country. 
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The consequence is oblivion. In the face of this faith, and as an opposition-
al force, transformative critical theory can easily be dismissed by dominant 
culture as the noble gesture buried in the paperwork of institutional 
implementation of poor relief. 151 What appears as arrogance to a dissent-
er,152 may be an aggressive expression of faith by dominant culture. 153 
Marginalized by dominant culture, consigned to the zoo of exotic (but 
dangerous) endeavors, transformative critical (outsider) theory at times best 
serves the very members of the dominant culture which this theory seeks 
to recast. Critical theory can be the dominant culture's theoretical 
bogeymen. It assumes its greatest social utility as fairy stories evoking 
images of the evil (witches, goblins, little people, spirits, deformities--you 
choose) which live in the dark, apocryphal forest just outside the safe 
clearing of current dominant norms. These are the kind of stories used by 
a dominant culture to reinforce its cultural norms. As our welfare reform 
debates since 1994 make clear, these images are more useful than ever, 
especially now that communism is no longer readily available for 
scapegoating. 
There is a lesson here for outsider theorists as well as for liberal 
theorists. It is impossible to engage the dominant culture in a language 
unintelligible to it, using, for example, what Professor Balkin calls "cultural 
software" unknown to the dominant groUp.l54 It is impossible to persua-
sively argue to the dominant culture in favor of polyculturalism using the 
very language of chauvinism and dominance which critical theory utilizes 
151. Consider in this light Lucie William's story of Mrs. G. in White, Subordination, 
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes, supra note 142. 
152. "Unilateral power can beget arrogance, including the arrogance of insisting that one's 
worldview, one's interests, and one's way of framing an issue, are the only ones." Richard 
Delgado and David H. Yun, Essay II, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis 
of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REv. 871, 890 (1994). 
153. Consider the resulting difficulty of dialogue which results. See, e.g., Richard Delgado 
& David Yun, The Neoconservative Case Against Hate-Speech Regulation - Lively, 
D'Souza, Gates, Carter, and the Toughlove Crowd, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1807 (1994). Even 
within the dominant group, communication can be difficult. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, 
Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 DUKE L.J., 989, 1077-87 (1994) (liberals and communitarians 
find it hard to communicate because of emphasis on different meaning of responsibility). 
154. See J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Cultural Software, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 1221, 1225 
(1995) (cultural software is the processes, contexts and understandings we employ in the 
process of understanding and evaluation). Ultimately, then, the absurdists are right, and with 
a vengeance, when it comes to debating social policy involving the poor. I refer to that 
movement in French and English theater, at its height in the 1950s and 1960s, that lamented 
and exposed the senselessness of the human condition. Generally, absurdist writers hold that 
human beings exist in an unpredictable universe in which their actions tend to compound 
the general unpredictability of phenomena. Forging predictability is futile in this universe 
because humans are innately incapable of communicating with each other at any but the 
most superficial level. Cj SAMUEL BECKEIT, WAITING FOR GoOOT (1954) (a play 
expressing the absurdity of, as well as the need for, some external rational guide). 
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as an indictment against the dominant culture. 155 From the mere existence 
and recognition of "others," one cannot necessarily cede power from an 
aggressive dominant culture to aggressive "other" cultures that share a 
common space. Cultures are not yet nation-states; there can be no treaty 
relationships between them. 156 A dominant culture will tolerate, and to 
that extent recognize, others, but no farther. 15? 
Thus, to a certain degree, critical theorists can sometimes fall into the 
very old Marxist-Leninist trap: it is one thing to identify racism and 
patriarchy Gust as it was to identify capitalism) as an evil; it is quite another 
to assume or argue that it inevitably follows that naming the evil will result 
in its destruction or transmogrification. 15s It is error to assume that 
155. See, e.g., FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 15, at 5, 227-37 (redefining 
family to extirpate patriarchy); Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 539 
(1989) (proposing a legal jurisprudence grounded in the voices of African-American 
females). 
156. And yet, critical discourse begins to dissolve the classical definitional differences 
between nation-state, group, and class. For me, there is an eerie sense of volks-driven 
national socialism embedded in this enterprise. It is perhaps unconscious, perhaps uninvited, 
and unexcused by the fact that it is what is being done to others. Consider Duncan 
Kennedy's affirmative action enterprise based on the "need to be able to talk about the 
political and cultural relations of the various groups that compose our society without falling 
into racialism, essentialism, or a concept of the 'nation' tied to the idea of sovereignty. We 
need to conceptualize groups in a 'post-modem' way, recognizing their reality in our own 
lives without losing sight of the partial, unstable, and contradictory character of group 
existence." Duncan Kennedy, Frontier of Legal Thought III: A Cultural Pluralist Case for 
Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 705. See also Charles 
Lawrence III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the JUrisprudence of Transformation, 
47 STAN. L. REv. 819 (1995) (suggesting the utility of the replacement of individual with 
group based remedies/rights theories to combat the subordinating tendencies of the dominant 
race/culture group using the South African model). 
157. "Human beings possess an inexhaustible drive to evaluate, to pronounce what is good 
and bad, beautiful and ugly, advantageous and disadvantageous. Before culture, human 
values are inchoate and indeterminate; through culture they become differentiated, 
articulated, and refined." Balkin, supra note 154, at 1225. Calls for recognition of multiple 
cultural evaluative processes will fall on deaf (dominant group) ears. Transformative models 
remain "defeated dreams." Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black 
Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563, 1565 (1996) (reviewing LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT 
ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE and JILL QUADAGNO, THE 
COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY). Other 
transformative agendas fare no better. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: 
An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. 
REv. 269, 309 (1992) (calling for recognition of linguistic polyculturalism); Reginald 
Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself': Deconstructing the Violent Discourse 
Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 15,21 & n.13 (1993). 
158. But there is power in a name. Labelling theory has taught us that we tend to become 
what we are called. See, e.g., David P. Farrington, The Effects of Public Labelling, 17 BRIT. 
J. CRIMINOLOGY 112 ( 1977). Yet, it also reveals the possibility of alternative shared truths 
which may well have the effect of beginning a transmogrification. On the notion of naming 
and truth, and the relationship of both to law and culture, see Larry Calli Backer, 
Constructing the 'Homosexual' of Constitutional Theory: Sodomy, Narrative and Antipathy 
'mas-
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something like the normative substructure of our law and society is weak, 
unsupported, decrepit, decadent, or inevitably (and quickly) doomed to 
oblivion, only to be replaced by a new world order. 159 
This point implies another aspect of the central lesson of this paper-we 
have met the enemy and "they is us." I have tried to show the way in 
which even critical scholarship can at times adopt the language and vision 
of the normative substructure which is criticized as fundamentally "bad." 
Critical scholars sometimes use the language of polyculturalism to mask 
another-that of substitution. Consciously or unconsciously, what may be 
sought is the substitution of one system of judgments for another, the 
transposition of subordinated and subordinating groupS.l60 The critical 
in u.s. and British Courts, 71 TuL. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996). 
159. Consider classic Marx, whose work modern political Hegelians tend to internalize if 
consciously forget. 
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class strug-
gles .... [O]ppressor and oppressed stood in constant opposition to one 
another. . . . The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins 
of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but 
established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle 
in place of the old ones. 
Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Manifesto o/the Communist Party, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE 
WESTERN WORLD 419, (Robert M. Hutchins ed. & Samuel Moore trans. 1952). 
Modern bourgeois society ... is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to 
control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his 
spells. . .. The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the 
ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself. But not only has the 
bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called 
into existence the men who are to wield these weapons--the modern working 
class, the proletarians. 
Id. at 422. But see Robinson, supra note 157. 
Consider the modern critical variations--some are tied directly to a racial-economic 
analysis with Marxist-Hegelian transformative overtones. See, e.g., Robinson, supra, at 22-
24, 33, 108-09 (explaining, in a rich analysis, how the "logic of monopoly capitalism 
properly explains the violent discourse between African and Korean Americans"). Some 
apply the pattern of revolution following from conflict and resulting in the replacement of 
the decadent "Old" covenant by the "New." See, e.g., FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra 
note 15 (on the replacement of patriarchy with a new social order); Duncan Kennedy, The 
Stages o/the Decline o/the PubliC/Private Distinction, 130 U.PA. L. REv. 1349 (1982) (on 
the life cycles of legal distinctions). Social constructivists fall into the same trap. See, e.g., 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607 (1994). For a 
discussion, see Larry Cata Backer, Storytelling, Deviance and Revolution in Law (1996) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
160. "Whiteness" is one name frequently given to a set of normative cultural assumptions 
in need of reconstruction/destruction. The literature is enormous and not monolithic. See 
generally Lawrence, supra note 156, at 835-39; Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle, 
supra note 145. "Patriarchy" is another name given to this set of governing norms. Again 
the literature is enormous and not monolithic. See, e.g., FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, 
supra note 15. However, substitution critique is not lost on the dominant group. The notion 
of replacement (for that is how it can easily be misinterpreted, elevated and distorted) can 
then be used to dismiss the critical genre in its entirety. But then, that is the danger of 
436 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:2 
juncture arrives when one presses not merely for "a place at the table" or 
for "voice," but when one also insists that one must speak for others and 
that others must accept what is spoken, for it is "good." At this point the 
transmogrification becomes complete-all groups have their "Napo-
leon.,,161 I am not sure that in a stable socio-cultural system 
polyculturalism is possible--hermeneutics requires a singular text. 162 
This point underscores another repercussion of my observation that 
there is no enemy "outside" in the battles over the manner of succoring our 
poor. We must keep firmly in mind that the enemy we each carry (if, after 
all, you deem "it" an enemy at all) eliminates the utility of an analysis 
based on the existence of some mythical "other" who is the source of 
everything that is "bad" about American welfare. There is no international 
conspiracy of fascists, bankers, and communists who together, and from 
secret cells within and without government, are manipUlating welfare reform 
for their own (and by definition not our) ends on the basis of their (not our) 
groups - both subordinating and subordinated groups. Groups must exclude, otherwise they 
lack definition. Political groups will define and by defining both judge and exclude. The 
issue of the particular judging and exclusion is a matter of politics and power. Our 
academic language cloaks these imperatives in the soothing language of principle and reason. 
But the result is always the same. For basic studies on groups, see Walter O. Weyrauch & 
Maureen A. Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the "Gypsies," 103 YALE LJ. 323 
(1993). Consider what troubles Professor Slaughter about a potential response to patriarchy 
and its effects especially on welfare mothers: 
Fineman responds to patriarchy with a maternalist fantasy. It is her belief 
that a social order favoring mothers can only be established by redefining 
socially valuable intimacy as nurturing rather than sexual. This, however, 
erases the erotic from public and legal sight. It works to a similar end as 
patriarchal proposals and requires a similar denial of public recognition of 
feminine sexuality. Fineman envisions the mother/child dyad as the core of 
her maternal utopia, but just like the patriarchal figure of the welfare queen, 
the mother/child dyad presents harmonious social identity by masking 
irresolvable antimonies. 
Slaughter, supra note 105, at 2180. 
161. For a perceptive analysis of the inevitability of this process, see GEOGE ORWELL, 
ANIMAL FARM (1946). 
162. In this sense, I take seriously a point made by Professor Steve Feldman: 
Thus, we constantly constitute and reconstitute our tradition, our culture, and 
our community as we engage in hermeneutic actions. Most important, this 
constant reconstitution is always simultaneously constructive and destructive. 
It is constructive in the sense that we constantly build new traditions and 
communities, constantly adding to our already existing traditions and 
communities through interpretation and understanding, thus including new 
concepts, interests, prejudices and significantly, participants. Yet the 
reconstitution is also destructive - distortive and exclusive - insofar as we 
weaken or eliminate previously existing traditions and communities and 
exclude concepts, interests, and participants. 
Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REv. (forth-
coming Fall 1996) (manuscript at 26, on file with author). 
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cultural norms. 163 Nothing that happens in welfare reform occurs except 
in conformity with the basic values of our society (whether we, as 
individuals, agree with the value mix that resulted in the particular form of 
the reform or not).I64 
It is foolish to believe in the pervasiveness of such conspiracies as the 
grounding of dominant norms in one form or another-to believe in the 
passive or active manipulation of socio-cultural norms exclusively by a 
hidden, small band of this or that type of group within dominant culture, 
whose norms do not reflect those of the majority of peoples inhabiting a 
particular place, and who are able to get people and groups to act against 
their own best interests. That reeks of National-Socialist, Maoist or Stalinist 
paranoia. It implies, at its worst, a kind of culturally hypocritical revolution 
we have seen, for instance, in Cuba-the land of fungible tyrannies. 165 
It posits a dictatorship of a proletariat of the correct thinking-of those who 
would substitute their vision for those of the other. What makes this 
somewhat more troubling is that this otherness, as I have suggested, exists 
culturally anyway, perhaps no more than "skin" deep. That is especially 
true in poor relief. 
The dominant majority will tend to ignore writings which marginalize 
its views and seek to sweep away (without much ado, but with much scorn) 
its core normative values. Such writings do not communicate with the 
163. The allusion I make here is to the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," a tsarist fabrica-
tion purportedly documenting the international conspiracy of a worldwide network of Jews 
planning take over the world by stealth. See NORMAN COHN, WARRANT FOR GENOCIDE: 
THE MYTH OF THE JEWISH WORLD CONSPIRACY AND THE PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF 
ZION (1966). For a sampling of these types of notions, see TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT 
OF COMMON DREAMS: WHY AMERICA IS WRACKED BY CULTURE WARS (1995) (failures 
of the left are in part a fabrication by a conspiracy of conservative white male social critics 
funded in particular by the John M. Olin Foundation). In any case, I am not convinced that 
all groups, dominant and "other" are done ascribing to Jewish people, as an essentialized 
collective, blame for much that is "wrong" with the world. See generally STEPHEN 
FELDMAN, DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 
OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (forthcoming 1997) (on the nature of the 
Christian domination of American society and culture). 
164. As I have remarked in another context: 
There is no running away from American poor relief - no shirking of 
responsibility for its contours. There is no blaming of the system's faults on 
"Republicans," or "liberals," or someone else's "culture," or people who are 
not ''us.'' In this case, physical presence cannot be combined with 
metaphysical isolation. Each of us has been touched by the assumptions of 
the static paradigm, willingly or not, irrespective of our ideologies of 
separation. 
Backer, Welfare Reform at the Limit, supra note 3, at 343. 
165. On the socio-cultural conservatism of the current dictatorship in Cuba, see, e.g., 
MARVIN LEINER, SEXUAL POLmCS IN CUBA: MACHISMO, HOMOSEXUALITY, AND AIDS 
(1994) (on the sexual prejudice of the revolutionary "Communist" regime in Cuba). 
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dominant groUp.l66 They cannot. The dominant group will not engage 
in dialogue on the basis of its acceptance of the notion that it must be 
destroyed or swept aside. Hermeneutics as suicide is rare, for most 
cultures, especially dominant cultures. 
And so, one might wonder whether the one-sided and demonizing 
dialogue is not indeed the kind of dialogue which the dominant culture 
expects of its minorities. The mutual incomprehensibility of narrative 
becomes apparent--people don't listen except to what they want to hear. 
That truism, applied to the dominant group, is applicable to the voices of 
the "other" as well. 167 As the excerpts recounted in the BroderlNavarro 
paper suggest, both dominant and subordinated groups celebrate the primacy 
of their respective core norms. Each will enforce those norms, punish 
deviants, and seek to convert or control "others" existing within the same 
metaphysical space. 168 Tolerance and deviance are thus reduced to issues 
of power and identity (and the power to control the latter), a necessary 
analysis at which critical scholars have excelled. But the perception that 
this sort of reductionist explanation provides the full source of understand-
ing, in turn, can reduce the interpretation of outsider dialogue to the 
cynically political. It is not race or culture or respect, but power and 
166. See, e.g., Eleanor Marie Brown, Note: The Tower of Babel: Bridging the Divide 
Between Critical Race Theory and 'Mainstream' Civil Rights Scholarship, 105 YALE L.J. 
513, 515 (1995) ("When it comes to legal scholarship addressing race, by contrast, it is 
striking that despite the existence of critical race theory for nearly a decade, the response 
to it has generally been a conversation among those who identify themselves as critical race 
theorists. "). 
167. Consider the oppositional perspectives of groups through the eyes of Richard Delgado: 
They conclude that, because the world is fair yet we are poor and despised, 
there must be something wrong with us individually, or with our culture or 
family - we are not among the Elect. We, by contrast, having the same 
belief in a fair world but knowing that we are normal - like everyone else 
- interpret differences in the distribution of social goods like jobs, 
longevity, wealth, and happiness as evidence of malevolence or neglect on 
the part of those in power, or else as basic defects in the social system. 
Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle, supra note 75, at 1199 (reviewing RICHARD EpSTEIN, 
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992)). 
168. Thus, Richard Delgado can echo the call of some academics to white people "who 
want to help can become traitors to the white race." Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle, 
supra note 7, at 95. In critical scholarship, that may be seen as "good." Other sorts of race 
treason, especially treason to the norms or at least the political aspirations of subordinated 
groups, is "not good" in the literature. See, e.g., Wendy Brown, In the 'folds of our own 
discourse ': The Pleasures and Freedoms of Silence, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 185, 
192-93 (1996); Diana C. Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation and 
Guilty Liberalism, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 1053, 1120-21 (1994) (on the conflict between 
cultural/racial solidarity and the perpetuation of patriarchal subordination of women). But 
each is actively controlled by the socio-economic matrix within groups. See Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals' Dilem-
ma, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1093-95 (1996) (especially the stories with which she starts 
the article). 
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placement on the socio-economic (and institutional) hierarchy which is the 
real topic of negotiation. And the solution? Like the problem, it is 
ephemeral and elusive. As I have tried to show in Part II, it is also a 
moving target. My focus here, however, is not on a solution, but on the 
limitations of communication on issues touching core social norms. 
What remains is a kind of dialogue based on mutual non-recognition. 
This is a dialogue which breeds subordination as groups apply the 
normative principles of conformity and assimilation to as large a group of 
people as possible. Social cohesion, the discipline of the group in the face 
of mutual incompatibility, requires choice. From the perspective of the 
dominant group, subordination means reducing contrary cultural norms to 
a silence in the public (though not the private) space. Polyculturalism can 
exist in theory-in reality it describes a transitional period between the 
dominance of one set of socio-cultural norms and another. A set of norms 
must govern, and yet all norms are subordinating of those who are defined 
as outsiders--and every group has its outsiders. As such, a dominant group 
can hear outsider scholarship as the strident attempt by one group to impose 
its norms on all others--norms which will subordinate and exclude in ways 
different from that of the current norms, but exclude and subordinate 
regardless. Perversely, much of the rhetoric of the outsider may hide the 
shared normative values of all such groups in the West, those values which 
I described in Part I of this paper, which might well facilitate dialogue at 
some level. Perceived as imperialist and threatening, of "outsiders" vying 
for the role of "dominant," outsider discourse is rendered meaningless noise 
in the ears of the dominant. 
IV. Conclusion 
Mere exposure of the racist or patriarchal underpinnings of culture and 
law, alone, cannot change either. Nor are chauvinism, patriarchy, or racism 
peculiar to this culture. Groups, and their cultures, define and exclude to 
survive. They are "a set of collectively created tools of understanding,,169 
and are not lightly discarded or changed. The papers presented at this 
Symposium clearly illuminate both the possibilities and the limitations of 
welfare reform in our country and in our century. The papers demonstrate 
quite forcefully the radical dependance of each on the other and their 
oppositions, all within a singular core normative framework: immigrant 
baiting and the productivity of immigrants; wrongheaded punishments and 
public monitoring; bad parent and good parent; good parent and wronghead-
ed punishment; bad parent and public monitoring; immigrant baiting and 
bad parent; immigrants are productive and nice parents; public monitoring 
169. Balkin, supra note 156, at 1224. 
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and immigrant baiting. 
Those whose business it is to think through the problems of welfare and 
the poor must move away from the ancient infatuation with binaries, toward 
notions of opposition based on a mutable continuum of variation. The only 
real permanence within the borders of our normatively limiting world is 
infinite variation and constant struggle. 
